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“An Anesthesiologist, a Brain Surgeon and a Nurse Walk into a Bar . . . ”: A Call for Change in 
How America Handles Health Care Worker Substance Abuse 
 
Angelica Halat* 
 
I.      Introduction 
President Richard Nixon waged the War on Drugs in 1971. 1   Forty years later, the war 
continues, but the arena has evolved—the battlefield, once confined to streets, jails, and 
disreputable nightclubs, now includes the workplace.  Since the introduction of President Reagan’s 
Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988,2 public and private employers have been subjecting seasonal 
clerical assistants, commercial aircraft pilots, and workers in between to drug and alcohol testing 
as a condition of employment.  In fact, Americans have become so accustomed to the practice that 
it is now as commonplace as filling out the job application itself.3  It is surprising, then, that a 
country so quick to administer drug tests leaves out the one group of professionals that we, quite 
literally, entrust with our lives: health care workers.  
For years, voices from all sectors of society, including the medical field itself,4 have pushed 
for the testing of health care workers.  These calls for help have even motivated legislative attempts 
to mandate testing.  In 2013, a group of New Hampshire State Representatives introduced HB-597 
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Lehigh University.  Thank you to Professor 
Charles Sullivan and my fellow Law Review editors for their help and guidance throughout the writing of this 
Comment.  I also extend my thanks to my friends and family for their continued love and support.  
1 Ed Vulliamy, Nixon’s “War on Drugs” Began 40 Years Ago, and the Battle is Still Raging, THE GUARDIAN (July 
23, 2011) http://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years.    
2 Exec. Order No. 12564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (Sept. 15, 1986).  The Act required federal employees to refrain from 
using illegal drugs, and directed executive agencies to create and implement a plan to ensure a drug-free workplace.  
It also authorized each agency to create a drug testing program for “employees in sensitive positions” based on a 
reasonable suspicion, following an accident, and as part of, or following, rehabilitative treatment.  Id. § 3(a).  
3 M. R. Levine & W. P. Rennie, Pre-Employment Urine Drug Testing of Hospital Employees: Future Questions and 
Review of Current Literature, 61 OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED 318, 318 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1740763/pdf/v061p00318.pdf  (discussing how common workplace 
drug testing has become in America, and noting that “more than 90% of US companies with over 500 employees have 
some sort of drug screening programme in place.”).  
4 See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, PhD, Doctors and Nurses Should Be Drug-Tested – Get Used to It, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 1, 
2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/808385. 
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to require health care facilities to establish a program to randomly test all health care employees 
at least four times per year.5  The story of David Kwiatkowski, a hospital technician, represents 
the most drastic flaws in how our current health care system handles drug and alcohol abuse by 
physicians, and spurred lawmakers to propose the bill.6  After Kwiatkowski infected 32 people in 
New Hampshire with Hepatitis-C in the course of feeding his addiction,7 the New Hampshire 
Legislature attempted to nudge the medical field in the right direction by introducing a bill that 
would have required hospitals to enact and implement drug testing policies.8   
On the other side of the country, California’s Proposition 46 made headlines as potentially the 
first law to mandate statewide drug and alcohol testing for state-licensed physicians.9  The testing 
provision, part of a broader effort to raise the state’s malpractice liability cap, proposed to test 
professionals according to a drug testing program used by employers regulated by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT).10  While the proposition failed, Californians supported the 
drug testing portion of Proposition 46 both before11 and after the November elections,12 although 
many fiercely debated its constitutionality.  For example, Natasha Minsker of the American Civil 
                                                        
5 H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013).  
6 Aaron Sanborn, Random Drug Testing Taken Out of Hepatitis C Bill, SEACOASTONLINE.COM (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.seacoastonline.com/article/20131105/News/311050336.  
7 Mark A. Abramson, et. al, Exposing The “Dirty Little Secret”: Random Drug Testing of Health Care Workers in the 
Wake of the Hepatitis C Outbreak, 54 N.H. BAR J. 10, 10 (2014) (explaining that Kwiatkowski, fueled by his fentanyl 
addiction, would inject himself with the fentanyl meant for patients, refill the used syringes with saline, and then leave 
the syringes to be used on patients later).  
8 H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013).  But see H.B. 597, 2014 Legis., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014) (amending the 
bill’s mandatory random testing scheme to simply require licensed facilities to adopt a drug-free workplace policy). 
9 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7. 
10 49 C.F.R. § 40 (2012).  
11 Press Release, University of Southern California, USC Dornsife/L.A. Times Poll: Support for Prop. 46 Drops 
Steeply as Voters Hear Initiative Details (Sept. 15, 2014), available at https://pressroom.usc.edu/usc-dornsifela-times-
poll-support-for-prop-46-drops-steeply-as-voters-hear-initiative-details/ (explaining that a September 2014 poll 
conducted by USC Dornsife and the Los Angeles Times revealed that the PPSA’s testing mandate was the most 
popular of the suggested measures, with 70% of those polled in support of the idea).  
12  Chris Kardish, California Won’t Drug Test Doctors, GOVERNING (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-california-medical-malpractice-doctors-drug-testing-ballot.html 
(reporting that while they disagreed with the proposition as written, “the ACLU and California’s biggest doctor lobby 
didn’t completely dismiss the idea of drug testing doctors . . . .”).  
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Liberties Union of North California argued that the testing program was unconstitutional and went 
“too far” by threatening to take away a doctor’s medical license for failing a test.13  On the other 
hand, Jamie Court of Consumer Watchdog argued that doctors are within the classes of employees 
that may constitutionally be tested,14 and that Proposition 46 is a constitutional method of doing 
so.15  
 After its turn at the polls in November 2014, Proposition 46 failed to become law, with 
67% of voters opposing it.16  Still, many believe the testing policy itself was not to blame: the chief 
executive of the California Medical Association, Dustin Corcoran, who also served as the chairman 
of the campaign against the initiative, stated of the initiative’s failure, "[i]n this health care 
environment, undermining California's long-standing malpractice cap is a political poison pill.”17  
Further, because the testing mandate was included in the initiative as a “‘sweetener’ designed to 
get voters to approve raising MICRA caps, which would be less likely to win on its own,”18 it is 
difficult to ascertain how many voters actually supported the testing provision itself. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that drug testing was the problem in New Hampshire’s HB-
597, which originally called for the random testing of every health care worker in the state at least 
                                                        
13 Christopher Cadelago, Doctor Drug Testing Latest Front in Medical Malpractice Measure, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/election/article2607425.html. 
14 Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Prop. 46 Author Calls on ACLU to Explain 
Why It Says Doctors Are Not in Safety Sensitive Positions & Should Not Be Tested (Aug. 26, 2014) available at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-prop-46-author-calls-aclu-explain-
why-it-says-doctors-are-not). 
15 Cadelago, supra note 13.  
16 Michael F. Haverluck, Did CA Keep Costs Low by Voting Down Raising Malpractice Cap?, ONENEWSNOW (Nov. 
15, 2014), http://www.onenewsnow.com/legal-courts/2014/11/15/did-ca-keep-costs-low-by-voting-down-raising-
malpractice-cap#.VKAm8DDDs. 
17  Michael R. Blood, Attempt to Raise Medical Malpractice Cap Defeated, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/5/initiative-would-raise-medical-malpractice-cap/?page=all. 
18 Yul D. Ejnes, MD, California’s Proposition 46 and Mandatory Physician Drug Testing: A Cause for Concern, VOL. 
161 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED., 911, 911 (2014).  
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four times a year.19  The state legislators ultimately decided to replace the random test provision 
with a more politically pleasing substitute: testing based on the nebulous “reasonable suspicion.”20  
Thus, based on these legislative calls for change, as well as the support from various sectors, it 
seems as though the idea of drug testing physicians in fact carries much weight.  The question, 
then, is why have we not yet implemented a program to drug test medical employees?  Opponents 
claim that drug testing is ineffective and invades personal privacy,21 but those arguments would 
also seem to apply to pilots, teachers, and clerical assistants, all of whom are subject to testing.  
Opposition to drug testing largely relies on constitutional, ethical, and financial arguments.  
The constitutionality of drug testing physicians, however, is no different than the constitutionality 
of drug testing other employees carrying out safety-sensitive tasks, and the ethics of testing 
physicians is even clearer: if it is ethically acceptable to test bus drivers22 despite the supposed 
flaws in drug testing,23 it is undoubtedly just as acceptable to test health care workers for drug 
and/or alcohol impairment.  Additionally, while drug testing may increase operating expenses for 
medical professionals, testing is worth the added cost for two reasons: not only is testing estimated 
                                                        
19 H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013).  See also Sanborn, supra note 6 (explaining that since its introduction, 
organizations such as the New Hampshire Association of Counties opposed the bill because “mandatory drug testing 
would have a significant cost to the state’s 11 nursing homes and three assisted-living facilities”).  
20 Abramson, supra note 7 at 14.  Based on the switch in testing policies, it seems that HB-597 was also a victim of 
politics. 
21  Brandon Cohen, Drug-Test Physicians? Docs Say ‘No Way’, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/830211. 
22 49 .C.F.R. § 382.103(a) (explaining that all “persons who operate a commercial motor vehicle in commerce in any 
State” are subject to drug testing).  
23  Kristina Fiore, APA: Drug Test Results Often Flawed, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 23, 2010), 
http://www.medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/APA/20253 (noting that one in 20 patients will receive an 
inaccurate drug test result, which is more likely to be a false positive than a false negative). 
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to eventually decrease health care spending,24 but it also helps to ensure the safety of the doctor-
visiting public.25   
Despite the logic behind drug testing medical professionals, calls to implement such testing, 
especially on a random basis, repeatedly fail in the political arena.26  Accordingly, to finally pass 
into law state-mandated testing for chemical impairment, a testing policy that is appropriately 
tailored to the medical field is necessary.  This Comment will discuss the guideposts that belong 
in a model state statute to provide for the testing of health care workers.   
 Part II of this Comment will explain the origins and proposed measures of California’s 
Proposition 46 and New Hampshire’s HB-597, as well as the reasons why they were rejected and 
limited, respectively.  Part III expounds on the need to test health care workers (“HCW”)27 based 
on recent data brought to light by the debates surrounding Proposition 46.  Part IV will demonstrate 
that, based on the constitutional framework for drug testing set forth in United States Supreme 
Court precedent, HCW are an appropriate class of employees to test for impairment such that 
testing would be a reasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  
                                                        
24 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, PROPOSITION 46, ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, at 31, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/proposition-46-title-summary-analysis.pdf (reporting the findings of an 
analyst retained by the state of California to assess the effects of Proposition 46, which revealed that random testing 
would deter physicians from substance use while on duty, leading to fewer medical errors, and therefore a decrease in 
overall health care spending).  See also Michael R. Oreskovich et al., Prevalence of Alcohol Use Disorders Among 
American Surgeons, 147 ARCH SURG. 168, 170–71 (2012) (explaining that a study published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association suggested that testing might reduce malpractice litigation because “surgeons with 
alcohol abuse or dependence constituted 77.7% of surgeons reporting a medical error in the previous 3 months” which 
“suggests a potential relationship with quality of care.”).  
25 It follows that if testing decreases the amount of medical errors, hospitals and/or doctors would be sued less 
frequently, avoiding litigation costs and providing patients a safer and healthier supply of medical professionals.   
26 See discussion infra Parts IIB and IID.  
27 This Comment proposes guideposts for drug testing all “health care workers” (“HCW”), a group which includes 
any professional who treats, or assists in the treatment of, a patient in any way, and any professional with access to 
drugs in a medical setting.  See Occupational Outlook Handbook: Healthcare Occupations, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/home.htm.  
For example, a phlebotomist and a pharmacist would be within the “HCW” category for purposes of this Comment, 
while a dietician would not be.  Id. 
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Part V will set forth guideposts to include in drug testing legislation that is appropriately 
tailored to the medical field, taking into account the shortcomings of Proposition 46 and the 
original HB-597, the profession’s self-regulation, and the consequences of relying on a drug test 
alone to ensure patient safety.  Part VI examines the unintended consequences of drug testing 
HCWs, and rebuts the common oppositions to testing.  Finally, Part VII will conclude the 
Comment, demonstrating that the need for drug testing in the medical field far outweighs the 
negative consequences and costs. 
II.     The Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act and New Hampshire HB-597 
The Pack Patient Safety Act and HB-597 were two attempts to effect change in the regulation 
of the medical field by calling for the random drug and alcohol testing of physicians.  Although 
the bills differed in their details, they are similar in that they were reactions to tragic incidents by 
impaired doctors, and they ultimately could not amass the support to become law.   
A.     The Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act: Origins and Proposed Measures 
 
Proposition 46, entitled the Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act (PPSA), was introduced 
by California resident Bob Pack, who began his fight against medical negligence when his two 
children were struck and killed by a driver who was under the influence of alcohol and drugs— 
drugs that had been prescribed to her by six different doctors working within the same hospital.28  
The physicians failed to check the state’s prescription drug monitoring system, called Controlled 
Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES), prior to prescribing the driver, 
Jimena Barreto, the painkillers.29  
                                                        
28  New Measure Would Require Drug Testing for Doctors, ABC 7 NEWS (May 17, 2014), 
http://abc7news.com/news/new-measure-would-require-drug-testing-for-doctors/64182/. 
29  Lisa Girion, Scott Glover, Reckless Doctors Go Unchecked, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/local/la-me-prescription-cures-20121230.   
 8 
What looked like a clear case of medical malpractice was not as helpful as might appear—
under California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), the Packs would be 
limited to an award of $250,000 for the loss of their children after a successful suit against the 
doctors for their negligence.30  Dissatisfied with the remedies available to those suffering such 
losses, Mr. Pack introduced the PPSA in 2013 in an effort to require doctors to use CURES to 
prevent patients from “doctor shopping” as Barretto had, and to raise the cap on medical 
malpractice damages in the event that the system once again fails to prevent such catastrophes.31   
For purposes of this Comment, the most important provision in the PPSA is the statewide drug 
and alcohol testing of physicians with admitting privileges,32 a group with a recognized substance 
abuse problem.33  In fact, in a March 2000 report, the Medical Board of California announced that 
eighteen percent of Californian physicians “may abuse alcohol or drugs during their lifetime,” and 
that at any given time, one to two percent of doctors are abusing these substances.34  Since 2003, 
the Board has disciplined 326 physicians for drug or alcohol abuse, 35 handling 46 of these cases 
                                                        
30 Nanette Miranda, Father Working to Change Law on Medical Malpractice Lawsuits, ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://abclocal.go.com/story?section=news/politics&id=9209527 (explaining that MICRA has never been adjusted for 
inflation since its passage in 1975, which would today amount to $1.1 million). 
31 Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Prop 46 Requiring Physicians to Check 
Statewide Prescription Drug Database Can Save Up To $406 Million Annually (Aug. 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-prop-46-requiring-physicians-
check-statewide-prescription-dru.  See also Miranda, supra note 30 (explaining that the proposed increase to the 
medical malpractice cap was simply a proposition to adjust the cap for inflation).  
32 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7.  See also Id. at § 2350.25(A), (A)(1) (providing that “hospitals shall conduct testing…on 
physicians who are employers or contractors or have the privilege to admit patients,” covering nearly the whole 
spectrum of physicians practicing within a hospital). 
33 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2 (citing an article from the Annals of Internal Medicine which reveals that at least one 
in ten physicians suffers from drug and alcohol abuse during his career, and that one third of physicians will experience 
a condition, such as substance abuse, that will affect the safety of their practice).  
34  MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, PHYSICIAN DIVERSION PROGRAM (2000), available at 
http://www.yeson46.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/18-percent-of-california-physicians-will-abuse-drugs-or-
alcohol-during-their-careers.pdf.  
35 Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Dr. Stephen Loyd, Who Survived Substance Abuse, Warns of Undetected 
Physician Impairment (Oct. 6, 2014), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-
watchdog-campaign-dr-stephen-loyd-who-survived-substance-abuse-warns-undetected. 
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between 2012-2013 alone.36  In addition, unlike most states, California does not offer its physicians 
a “bypass rehabilitation program,” through which doctors can avoid disciplinary action if they 
comply with treatment.37  California shut down its program in 2008 after finding that it allowed 
“impaired physicians to continue to practice,” and was not “effective in adequately protecting 
patients from substandard care.”38 
To implement the testing program, the PPSA would have adopted the guidelines used by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),39 which govern the drug and alcohol workplace policies 
for pilots, air traffic controllers and other employees working on or near aircraft.40  
While the PPSA cross-referenced the FAA program,41 it specifically enumerated key features 
of its proposed policy in the text of the initiative itself, the most controversial of which targeted 
testing.42  Under the PPSA, the California Medical Board would have required doctors to be tested 
after an “adverse event,” such as performing an incorrect procedure on a patient, prescribing the 
wrong medication, or other similar events as listed in § 1279.1 of the California Health and Safety 
Code.43  The Act required that within twelve hours of the event, the physician that treated the 
patient, or prescribed him medication in the twenty-four hours preceding the incident, report to a 
                                                        
36  MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, 2012–2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at 
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Publications/Annual_Reports/annual_report_2012-2013.pdf.  
37Keith H. Berge, M.D., et. al, Chemical Dependency and the Physician, 84 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS, 625, 625 
(July 2009).   
38 Sigrid Bathen, Doctors’ Drug Tests: A Divisive Issue, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Oct. 19, 2014), 
http://capitolweekly.net/drug-testing-doctors-prop-46-california7636/. 
39  49 C.F.R. § 40 (2012).  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is regulated by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), so its policy largely mirrors the DOT guidelines, but includes provisions tailored for aviation 
employees.  14 C.F.R. § 120 (2009).  See also Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, No on Prop 46 Doctor: Wine at 
Dinner More Important than Following Up on Patient Deaths and Injuries (Sept. 22, 2014), available at 
https://www.yeson46.org/no-on-prop-46-doctor-wine-at-dinner-more-important-than-following-up-on-patient-
deaths-and-injuries/ (explaining that the PPSA planned to implement FAA drug testing procedures).  
40 49 C.F.R. § 40 (2012). 
41 2014 Bill Text CA v. 7 § 4 (proposing that physicians be tested according to 49 C.F.R.§ 40, the testing procedure 
utilized by the DOT).  
42 Id.  
43 CAL. HSC. CODE § 1279.1(b)(1)(C), (b)(4)(A) (2007).  
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hospital for testing, for which he must pay out of his own pocket.  Upon a failure to appear for 
testing, or a refusal to provide a sample, the Attorney General’s Health Quality Enforcement 
Section would have immediately suspended him pending an investigation, and his employers 
would have been notified of both the suspension and investigation.44 
Finally, the PPSA would have tested doctors on the basis of referrals by colleagues and 
supervisors upon a reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use or impairment.45  This objective 
was problematic due to the medical profession’s notorious culture of silence,46 but the PPSA aimed 
to break down such barriers by mandating that physicians come forward when they believe a 
colleague may be, or may have been, impaired by drugs or alcohol while working.47 
The DOT testing guidelines underlie the FAA regulations, and call for the testing, and 
confirmatory testing, of the employee’s breath and urine samples.48  Should the second test return 
a negative result, the laboratory considers both results negative, and the matter is concluded.49  If 
                                                        
44 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.30 (mandating the immediate suspension of a doctor upon a refusal or failure to 
provide a sample, and notifying his employer and patients).  See also Peter Eisler, Doctors, Medical Staff on Drugs 
Put Patients at Risk, USA TODAY (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/15/doctors-
addicted-drugs-health-care-diversion/7588401/ (highlighting the difficulty in identifying substance abuse within the 
medical field, and noting that disciplinary action, “such as suspension of a license to practice, is rare and often doesn’t 
occur until a practitioner has committed multiple transgressions.”).   
45 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.25(A)(3).  
46 Many sources have discussed the unwillingness of HCWs to report an intoxicated colleague.  See Eisler, supra note 
44 (stating that despite the numerous times that David Kwiatkowski had been caught unconscious at work near an 
empty syringe, or running to the bathroom in the middle of a procedure to tend to his addiction, his colleagues never 
took any action).  See also Carla K. Johnson, Many Docs Don’t Blow Whistle on Colleagues, HUFFINGTON POST (July 
14, 2010) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/14/many-docs-dont-blow-whist_n_645703.html (reporting that 
17% of doctors surveyed by the Harvard Medical School had “direct, personal knowledge” of a doctor who had been 
working while impaired or incompetent, yet one-third had not reported their colleague).  
47 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.20.  The PPSA did not specify the consequences for a failure to report a colleague.  
Id.  However, it would have imposed upon physicians a statutory duty to report an impaired colleague.  See FAQ - 
Complaint Review Process, MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Consumers/Complaints/Complaints_FAQ/Complaint_Process_FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb. 
11, 2015) (explaining that physicians are not statutorily obligated to report an impaired colleague pursuant to the 
Medical Practice Act, but are encouraged by the Medical Board to do so).  See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805(b) 
(mandating only that the chief of staff of a peer review body or the chief executive officer of a medical facility file a 
report with the Medical Board of California upon a final decision on disciplinary action as to an employee).  
48 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.251 (for alcohol), 40.87 (for drugs).  See also 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.15(G) (providing for 
confirmatory testing of samples). 
49 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.255 (for alcohol), 40.87 (for drugs).  
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the test result is positive, the HCW may provide a legal explanation for the presence of the drug.50  
If he is unable to do so, his results are forwarded to the Medical Board of California, triggering the 
same disciplinary procedures that follow a failure or refusal to test.51  Like the FAA guidelines,52 
the PPSA suggested testing for the presence of marijuana metabolites, cocaine metabolites, 
amphetamines, opiate metabolites, and phencyclidine.53 
B.     The Pack Patient Safety Act: What Went Wrong? 
USC Dornsife and the Los Angeles Times, in a September 2014 poll, revealed that 70% of 
people supported the PPSA’s testing mandate.54  By Election Day, Proposition 46 proponents, 
comprised mostly of lawyers’ and consumers’ groups,55 amassed $12.4 million in support of the 
PPSA.56  Other proponents included various Democratic organizations and party leaders, the 
Consumer Federation of California, and a myriad of Patient Safety Advocates.57  
Conversely, PPSA opponents raised $57.8 million58 to combat the initiative, with the majority 
of the funds coming “from three medical malpractice insurers—the Cooperative of American 
Physicians, the Doctors Company and NORCAL Mutual Insurance Company,” each contributing 
                                                        
50 49 C.F.R. § 40.141.  See also 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.15(G) (providing doctors a chance to explain a positive 
test result).  
51 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.30(A) (requiring doctors to report any verified positive results, willful failures or 
refusals to test to the Medical Board, and enumerating the consequences of a positive result, or a failure or refusal to 
test).   
52 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DOT DRUG TESTING: ON AND AFTER OCTOBER 1, 2010 – STILL A 5-PANEL, 
available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Part%2040DOT5-PanelNotice_0.pdf (last updated Oct. 16, 
2012).  
53  2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.15(D).  But see Medical Professional Panels, QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, 
http://blog.employersolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MedPro-Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) 
(offering a customizable 10-panel drug test for HCWs based on the drugs available in the employer’s workplace); see 
also Medical Professional, LABCORP, 
https://www.labcorp.com/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hACzO_QCM_IwN3dyNX
AyNjQ2MvHxcXYwNjM6B8JJK8hVGoBVDeNcjZ0MTXwMDdmIBuP4_83FT9gtyIcgBVIMyI/dl2/d1/L2dJQSE
vUUt3QS9ZQnB3LzZfUTg2TlEyTjIwR0cyRTAyMzEzSkxERDMwVDM!/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (same).   
54 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 11. 
55 Endorsers, YES ON 46 – PACK PATIENT SAFETY ACT, https://www.yeson46.org/endorsers/ (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014). 
56 Haverluck, supra note 16. 
57 YES ON 46, supra note 55. 
58 Haverluck, supra note 16. 
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at least $10 million.59  Other opponents included medical groups, labor unions and civil liberties 
groups.60  With over four times as much money as the proponents, the anti-PPSA campaign 
succeeded in reaching voters via “a cascade of negative advertising” to drive home the message 
that the PPSA “would send medical costs soaring and drive doctors from the state.”61 
Although the post-election analyses are not clear on exactly what influenced voters, the late 
addition of the testing mandate to the initiative and the heavy campaigning by medical insurance 
groups suggest that most opponents were moved more by a desire to prevent the increase of the 
medical malpractice cap than the testing mandate.62  In fact, a few doctors and insurance group 
representatives have candidly said just that.63  Accordingly, it appears that Californians are largely 
receptive to the idea of state-mandated drug and alcohol testing of physicians.64 
C.     New Hampshire’s HB-597: Origins and Measures 
In 2012, 32 patients of the cardiac catheterization lab at New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital 
were diagnosed with Hepatitis C.65  The diagnoses surfaced after the hospital caught onto the antics 
of medical technician David Kwiatkowski, a fentanyl addict who bounced from hospital to hospital 
for nearly a decade, diverting drugs from each facility until his superiors discovered his addiction 
                                                        
59 Melanie Mason, Poll: Weak Support for Prop. 46 Targeting Medical Malpractice, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-poll-malpractice-20140913-story.html#page=1.   
60 Our Coalition, NO ON 46 (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.noon46.com/our-coalition/. 
61  Voters Turn Down Proposition 46 To Lift Medical Malpractice Cap, Require Drug Tests For Doctors, 
CBSSFBAYAREA (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:20 PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/11/04/proposition-46-doctors-
drug-tests-results/. 
62  Adam Nagourney, California Asks: Should Doctors Face Drug Tests?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/us/california-asks-should-doctors-face-drug-tests.html?_r=0 (explaining that 
the testing provision was added to the initiative to gain support for the PPSA’s main goal of raising the medical 
malpractice cap).  
63  Bob Egelko, High-Impact Details in Initiative Aimed at Doctors, SFGATE, Oct. 30, 2013, 
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/High-impact-details-in-initiative-aimed-at-doctors-4940955.php (quoting 
Molly Weedn, spokeswoman for the California Medical Association, as saying that the PPSA’s CURES and testing 
provisions were “nothing more than window dressing.”). 
64 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 11 (indicating that 70% of respondents favored the testing 
mandate, and 46% of voters opposed increasing the medical malpractice cap).  
65 Abramson, supra note 7, at 10. 
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and asked him to leave. 66   Kwiatkowski worked in numerous hospitals across eight states, 
sometimes being fired less than two weeks into an assignment.67  Although his employers had their 
suspicions, only one filed a complaint with the American Registry of Radiologic Technicians 
(ARRT), the national organization responsible for credentialing technicians and ensuring their 
adherence to industry ethical standards.68  Ultimately, even that investigation met a dead-end, and 
Kwiatkowski found himself in New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital on a temporary assignment, 
thanks to his staffing agency.69  Despite the misgivings and resistance from staff, Exeter hired 
Kwiatkowski as a full-time employee.70  One year later, an investigation into the Hepatitis C 
outbreak among the hospital’s patients revealed that 32 patients had contracted the disease as a 
result of contaminated syringes: Kwiatkowski had been injecting himself with the patients’ 
fentanyl and replacing the used syringes with saline, knowing that they would soon be used on the 
patients.71   
Consequently, in 2013, New Hampshire State Representatives introduced HB-597 to require 
state-licensed facilities to create a testing program to randomly test each HCW at least four times 
a year; if a facility failed to test, its license with the state would be suspended.72   
D.     HB-597: What Went Wrong? 
HB-597, entitled “An Act Relative to a Drug-Free Workplace for Licensed Health Care 
Facilities and Providers,” had some support, thanks to the success of drug testing programs in the 
anesthesiology departments of two out-of-state hospitals.73  Unfortunately, the New Hampshire 
                                                        
66 Id. at 11.  
67 Id. at 11 (explaining that Kwiatkowski was found unresponsive in a bathroom at work after overdosing on fentanyl 
just two weeks into his assignment at Arizona Heart Hospital).  
68 Id. at 12. 
69 Id.  
70 Abramson, supra note 7, at 13. 
71 Id. at 10.  
72 Id. at 13. 
73 Id. at 13.  
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Legislature diluted the bill before its passage, with the final version only requiring “health facilities 
to adopt policies permitting suspicion-based testing.”74  The main reason for HB-597’s change in 
testing policy is cost: John Poirier, the president of New Hampshire’s Health Care Association, 
claimed it would cost $2.6 million a year to test all 15,000 of the state’s health care workers.75  
Proponents of the original measure argued, however, that the change has essentially gutted the bill, 
especially since most hospitals, like Exeter Hospital, already had suspicion-based testing policies 
in place before HB-597 was passed.76   
III.     The Need to Run Tests on Our Doctors 
Despite its political unpopularity, the data largely supports the idea of drug testing HCWs.  
According to a 2010 study, “the rate of addiction among practicing physicians is estimated to be 
between 10% and 12%, the same as or slightly higher than the rate in the general population,” with 
alcohol being the drug of choice in almost half of all substance abuse cases.77  Another study, 
published in the American Journal of Medical Sciences, found that “approximately 15% of 
physicians . . . will be impaired at some point in their careers.”78  Furthermore, studies have shown 
that “chemical dependence is considered the most common disabling illness” among physicians,79 
and that physicians’ use of opioids (17.6% of physicians) and of benzodiazepine (11.4%) is 
roughly five times higher than that of the general population.80   
                                                        
74 Id. at 14.  
75 Id. 
76 Abramson, supra note 7, at 14. 
77 Marvin D. Seppala, M.D. & Keith H. Berge, M.D., The Addicted Physician, A Rational Response to an Irrational 
Disease, MINN. MED. (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.minnesotamedicine.com/Past-Issues/Past-Issues-
2010/February-2010/Clinical-Seppala-Feb-2010.  See also Oreskovich et al., supra note 24, at 171 (explaining a 
survey of 7,000 members of the American College of Surgeons, which revealed that 15.4% of the respondents had 
“answers consistent with alcohol abuse or dependence”).   
78 EV Boisaubin & RE Levine, Identifying and Assisting the Impaired Physician, 322 AM. J. MED. SCI. 31 (2001).  
79 Abramson, supra note 7, at 10.  
80 Id.   
 15 
Impaired HCWs can harm patients in a myriad of ways.  To begin with the obvious, a 
chemically impaired doctor operating on a patient can seriously injure, or even kill, a patient—
such is the case with Dr. Duntsch, a neurosurgeon from Texas with a drinking problem, whose 
performance was so horrific that a doctor who was called in to repair the damage caused by 
Duntsch contacted Duntsch’s school to see if he had actually graduated from medical school.81  
Although a former colleague at another hospital had already filed a complaint with the Texas 
Medical Board by this time, the bureaucratic entity moved so slowly that Dr. Duntsch operated on 
three more patients at his new hospital, killing one of them.82   
Additionally, as was the case in New Hampshire, HCWs can harm patients through drug 
diversion, “the illegal removal of drugs from a healthcare facility.” 83   In a similar vein to 
Kwiatkowski, Kristen Parker infected over a dozen patients with Hepatitis C via her contaminated 
syringes filled with saline, while Steven Beumel infected at least five people with the disease—
both were sentenced to thirty years in prison for their crimes.84   
Further compounding the trouble with drug testing HCWs is the culture of silence that 
permeates the medical field.  In 2010, a study published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association revealed that of the 2,000 physicians surveyed, 17% said that they had personally 
known an impaired or incompetent physician in the past three years and did not report that 
colleague’s problems to the relevant authority.85  Likewise, in a 2012 study, 33% of physicians 
revealed that they chose not to report a colleague that they knew was impaired.86 
                                                        
81 Saul Elbein, Anatomy of a Tragedy, TEXAS OBSERVER (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.texasobserver.org/anatomy-
tragedy/. 
82 Id.   
83 Abramson, supra note 7, at 10. 
84 Daniel R. Levinson & Erika T. Broadhurst, Why Aren’t Doctors Drug Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A27.  
85 Pee in This Cup, Doc: Random Drug Tests Should Be Standard for Physicians, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 14, 
2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pee-in-this-cup-doc-random-drug-tests-should-be-standard-for-
physicians/.  
86 Abramson, supra note 7, at 12. 
 16 
Once again, Mr. Kwiatkowski is a perfect example of this unfortunate phenomenon: although 
various health care facilities in Michigan fired him for “test[ing] positive for controlled 
substances” and for “gross misconduct,” his employers did not even inform his staffing agency, 
let alone the organization that certified him, which allowed Kwiatkowski to continue to infect 
patients in hospitals across the country.87  Even when the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
finally alerted Kwiatkowski’s staffing agency that the facility fired him after finding three empty 
syringes on his person, a needle and an empty syringe in his locker, and fentanyl and opiates in his 
urine, his staffing agency still did not report his conduct to the ARRT, but instead provided him 
with another assignment.88  The Arizona Heart Hospital of Phoenix, Arizona finally broke the 
pattern—when Kwiatkowski’s colleagues found him in the hospital bathroom after he overdosed 
on fentanyl just two weeks into his assignment, Arizona Heart notified the AART.   Unfortunately, 
the AART dropped its investigation into the matter when it learned that the Phoenix Police 
Department chose not to press charges against Kwiatkowski.89  
Another example comes from the case of Dr. Duntsch, the Texas neurosurgeon.  During the 
lawsuits filed by his injured patients, the plaintiffs alleged that the first hospital at which Dr. 
Duntsch practiced, Baylor Health Care System, failed to report him to the authorities because it 
had advanced him $600,000 to join the facility after finishing his residency at the University of 
Tennessee.90  Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the hospital failed to reveal the doctor’s ineptitude 
because “Baylor had spent a lot of money on Duntsch” and “if he didn’t work, they didn’t get 
paid.”91  The patients also alleged that the hospital failed to act after Duntsch “skipped out on five 
                                                        
87 Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 12.   
90 Saul Elbein, Licensed to Kill: Lawsuit Seeks to Overturn Texas Hospital Shield Law, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/02/texas-legal-doctor-lawsuit-christopher-duntsch. 
91 Id.  
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drug tests that Baylor Plano asked him to take,” and instead continued to advertise his services to 
the public.92 
Based on the studies revealing substance abuse by physicians, and the vivid examples of how 
the culture of silence enabled the deadly practices of Mr. Kwiatkowski and Dr. Duntsch, there is a 
strong need to test health care workers for drugs and alcohol.  
IV.     Testing HCWs Constitutes a Reasonable Search Under the Fourth Amendment 
Based on the constitutional framework for drug and alcohol testing set forth in United States 
Supreme Court precedent, HCWs are in fact an appropriate class of employees to test for 
impairment.  Although the problem of workplace intoxication by drugs or alcohol has been 
acknowledged in some industries for over a century,93 it was not until the 1980s that a wide cross-
section of employers began utilizing tests to ensure that employees were not impaired on the job.94  
After the Supreme Court decided the landmark cases of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Association95 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,96 a framework for analyzing 
the constitutionality of workplace drug testing began to take shape.  The Supreme Court refined 
the test in the late 1990s after handing down Veronia School District 47J v. Acton,97 and Chandler 
v. Miller.98  These cases counseled employers that they could lawfully test their employees when 
a governmental interest in testing, beyond the ordinary law enforcement need to collect criminal 
                                                        
92 Id.  
93 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (“The problem of alcohol use on American 
railroads is as old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it by carrier rules began at least a century ago.”). 
94 Id. at 607–609 (explaining that in 1983, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgated regulations 
requiring railroads to test pockets of employees after finding that the industry prohibitions on alcohol were insufficient 
to address the widespread drug and alcohol abuse).  
95 Id. at 602. 
96 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).  
97 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
98 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).   
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evidence, is both present and sufficiently strong as to outweigh the employee’s interest in 
privacy.99  
Using this framework, employers have implemented, and courts have upheld as constitutional, 
testing for those in “safety-sensitive” occupations,100 those who enjoy a diminished expectation of 
privacy by virtue of working in a highly regulated field,101 and those whose individual interest in 
privacy is outweighed by a governmental interest in ensuring that they are not impaired while 
working.102  Classes of employees that fall within this framework include teachers,103 trucking 
company drivers104 and flight attendants.105   
A.     Constitutional Rules as Set Forth by the Supreme Court  
 
1.     Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association 
 
Skinner is the first workplace drug testing case that the Supreme Court heard and upheld.  After 
a private railroad implemented a testing policy to comply with the regulations enacted by the 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to test employees, a labor union filed suit to enjoin it.106  
The FRA’s regulations aimed to address the industry-old problem of alcohol abuse on the railroad, 
which had resulted in accidents, fatalities and millions of dollars in property damage.107   
                                                        
99 Id. at 313–314.   
100 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).  
101 Id. at 627. 
102 Id. at 633.  
103 Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Count Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that teachers occupy 
safety-sensitive positions because they monitor the children entrusted to their care and have immediate impact upon a 
child’s life).  
104  Overview of Drug and Alcohol Rules, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/overview-drug-and-alcohol-rules (last updated Mar. 21, 2014).  
105 Bluestein v. DOT, 908 F.2d 451, 457 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990) (opining that “the administrative record adequately 
supports the FAA determination that [flight attendant] positions are, in fact, safety-sensitive.”).    
106 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) 
107 Id. at 606–607 (discussing the FRA’s evidence that between 1972 and 1983, more than 20 accidents involved 
“alcohol or drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor,” “result[ing] in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and 
property damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars).”)  (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (internal citations omitted).  
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In the event of an “impact” accident, the FRA mandated that employers collect and test blood 
and urine samples from the employees that were “directly involved” in the incident.108  The 
regulations afforded employees an opportunity to explain a positive test before the FRA prepared 
an investigative report, but policy also required a nine-month suspension of those who refused to 
provide a sample.109  Lastly, the regulations permitted employers to test employees’ breath or urine 
after an accident or safety violation, or based upon a reasonable suspicion garnered from “specific 
and personal observations” that the employee was impaired on the job.110  
The Supreme Court upheld the testing, establishing first that the Fourth Amendment,111 which 
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, applies to “arbitrary and invasive 
acts by officers of the Government” and those “act[ing] as an instrument or agent” thereof.112  
Accordingly, the private railroad’s search implicated the Fourth Amendment because of the degree 
of governmental involvement: the FRA regulations mandated the search, proving the 
government’s “encouragement, endorsement, and participation” of the testing.113 
Next, the Court recognized the blood, breath and urine testing as Fourth Amendment searches 
because the tests infringe upon “an expectation of privacy society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”114  Blood and breath tests physically intrude upon the body to obtain a sample of 
blood or “‘deep lung’” breaths for analysis.115  While urinalysis is not physically intrusive in the 
same way, the process by which the sample is obtained is irrefutably private, as well as the 
                                                        
108 Id. at 609–610.  
109 Id. at 610–611.   
110 Id. at 611.  
111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).  
112 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–614 (1989). 
113 Id. at 615–616. 
114 Id. at 617.  
115 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted) (internal citations omitted).  
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information to be revealed, which ranges from drug use to medical conditions, such as pregnancy 
and diabetes.116   
After establishing that such testing falls within the ambit of the Constitution, the Court paved 
the way to warrantlessly collecting specimens for testing.  The Fourth Amendment requires a 
warrant to conduct a search, but that necessity is dispensed with when an exception applies.117  
Luckily for employers, one such exception occurs when “special needs beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement” motivate the search.118  In such a case, rather than requiring a warrant or 
even a showing of probable cause to assess the reasonableness of the search, a court must balance 
the government’s interests in conducting the search on the one hand, and the intrusion of an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights on the other.119   
The Court recognized the government’s interest as ensuring the safety of railroad employees 
and the train-commuting public, deterring employee use of drugs and alcohol, and ascertaining 
and eliminating the causes of accidents.120  In fact, the “safety-sensitive tasks” that the covered 
employees performed, such as operating the trains and maintaining the signal systems, made the 
government interest in Skinner even stronger, since these were “duties fraught with such risks of 
injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.”121  
Against the government’s strong interest in safety, the Court balanced the employees’ interest 
in privacy and bodily integrity, and found that, while not insignificant, it was minimally implicated 
                                                        
116 Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987) (“[T]here are few activities in our 
society more personal or private than the passing of urine.  Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about 
it at all.”)).  
117 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  
118 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
119 Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976)).  
120 Id. at 621, 633.  
121 Id. at 620, 628.   
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by the testing program.122  To begin with, blood tests are routinely and safely performed during 
annual physicals, such that they do not hurt or traumatize employees.123  Breath tests are even less 
intrusive and can be done “with minimal inconvenience or embarrassment.”124  Likewise, while 
urinalysis implicates privacy concerns, the FRA regulations ensure a minimal intrusion by not 
requiring direct observation and by having non-railroad personnel obtain the samples in a medical 
environment.125  Under such circumstances, the urinalysis is similar to providing a urine sample 
during an annual physical.126  Furthermore, because the railroad industry is heavily regulated, 
employees have a “diminished expectation of privacy” as to “information relating to the[ir] 
physical condition,” such that their career choice decreases their privacy interest.127  The Court 
also noted that the regulations themselves provided those administering the tests with minimal 
discretion.128   
Finally, the Court emphasized that the FRA created a program with an effective means of 
deterring employees from using drugs and alcohol in the first instance.129  Based on all of the 
circumstances, Skinner held that the test minimally intruded on privacy interests.130  As such, it 
was reasonable for the government to test safety-sensitive employees for impairment with neither 
a warrant nor probable cause because these employees can “cause great human loss before any 
signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others.”131  
                                                        
122 Id. at 624.  
123 Id. at 625 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1996) (holding that blood tests generally extract 
minimal amounts of blood and “‘that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’”)).  
124 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).   
125 Id. at 626. 
126 Id. at 626–627. 
127 Id. at 627–628.   
128 Id. at 622.  
129 Id. at 629–630 (noting that the program informed employees that they were subject to testing without disclosing 
the specific date, “significantly increas[ing] the deterrent effect” of the policy and adding to its legitimacy).  
130 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. 
131 Id. 
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2.     National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 
In this Skinner companion case, the U.S. Customs Service, which processes people and items 
entering the country, implemented a testing policy for employees directly involved in drug 
interdiction, carrying firearms, or having access to “classified material.”132  The Service tested 
employees for marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine, and required them 
to provide a sample while a monitor listened “for the normal sounds of urination.”133  Following 
a confirmatory test, the Service sent the positive results to a licensed physician, who evaluated 
them along with the employee’s medical and prescription information to verify the presence of 
illegal substances.134  If the physician concluded that there was no legal explanation for the 
positive result, the employee would be dismissed.135   
To decide the case, the Supreme Court applied the reasonableness test just announced in 
Skinner.136  The government interests identified in Von Raab included deterring employees from 
using drugs and alcohol, and preventing the promotion of drug users to the specified positions.137  
As “our Nation’s first line of defense” against drug importation and its accompanying crime, the 
Court found that Customs officials hold “safety-sensitive” occupations—if the agents are not 
aware of the seriousness of their duties because of their own drug use, “this national interest in 
self-protection could be irreparably damaged.”138  Moreover, it is uncontroverted that handling 
weapons is a safety-sensitive task fraught with risks of catastrophic injury.  The Court concluded 
                                                        
132 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–661 (1989). 
133 Id. at 661–662. 
134 Id. at 662–663.  
135 Id. at 663. 
136 Id. at 665 (summarizing the rule as holding that when a Fourth Amendment search is conducted to advance a 
“special governmental need,” the reasonableness of the search is determined by balancing the interests of the 
individual and of the government). 
137 Id. at 666. 
138 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670. 
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that the public should not have to bear the risk of either type of employee operating while impaired, 
and the burden should fall on the U.S. Customs Service and its employees.139   
While Customs agents undoubtedly have an interest in their bodily integrity and informational 
privacy, the majority held that their interest is “diminished” with respect to “the intrusions 
occasioned by a urine test.”140  As in Skinner, the Court emphasized the effect of the nature of the 
employees’ occupation on their reasonable expectation of privacy, and noted that employees 
working with drugs and/or guns must expect inquiries as to “their fitness and probity.”141  Further, 
the procedures outlined in the policy minimized the invasiveness of the program by avoiding direct 
observation, testing solely for the presence of drugs, and not requiring the employee to disclose 
his medical information unless he tested positive for drugs.142   
Von Raab shed light on three additional considerations in assessing the reasonableness of 
workplace testing.  First, the Court opined that requiring individualized suspicion in such a non-
traditional work environment would be impracticable since Customs agents are not amenable to 
“the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm” in an office environment.143  Secondly, the lack 
of a known drug problem pervading the Customs Service was not dispositive of the program’s 
legality because “‘no segment of society is immune from the threat of illegal drug use,’” and in 
any event, the agency is entitled to enact a program that seeks to both detect drug use and prevent 
the promotion of drug users.144  Finally, the access that agents have to “vast sources of valuable 
                                                        
139 Id. at 668, 670. 
140 Id. at 670–671. 
141 Id. at 672. 
142 Id. at 672, n.2.  
143 Id. at 674.  
144 Von Raab, 489 at 660 (quoting the Joint Appendix at 10, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656 (1989) (No. 86-1879)), 674–675. 
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contraband” that has been confiscated provides another reason to test, due to the inevitable 
temptation presented to drug-using employees.145 
3.     Veronia School District 47J v. Acton 
The third drug testing case to reach the Supreme Court featured a new kind of authority 
imposing the drug test: rather than an employer testing its employees in Acton, a school district, 
comprised of a high school and three grade schools in Veronia, Oregon, was testing its students.146  
After noticing an increase in drug use in the 1980s, the Veronia School District implemented a 
testing program to eradicate school drug use by testing “the leaders of the drug culture,” the school 
athletes.147  To join a school sports team, a student had to submit a consent form, signed by himself 
and his parents, agreeing to be drug tested prior to joining the team, and randomly during the 
season if selected. 148   The students provided the urine sample in an empty locker room 
accompanied by a monitor of the same sex.149  The samples tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and 
marijuana, but administrators could request testing for other drugs, such as LSD.  Upon a 
confirmatory positive test result, the school sent the report to the superintendent, but the vice-
principals and athletic directors also had access to the results.150  A positive drug test resulted in 
either a six-week assistance program with weekly urinalysis, or suspension from the team for the 
rest of the current season and the following season.151  
The plaintiff, a seventh-grade boy precluded from trying out for the football team for failure 
to sign the consent form, filed suit against the school for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth 
                                                        
145 Id. at 669. 
146 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995). 
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Amendment rights.152  In assessing the reasonableness of the program, the Court first noted the 
key players in Acton: the administration of a public school district, an entity with “a degree of 
supervision and control” over the minors within its care, was testing public school students.153  
Because of the school’s caretaking role and the students’ status as minors, Acton and his classmates 
necessarily enjoyed a lesser expectation of privacy.154  Additionally, the student-athlete subset 
reasonably held an even lower expectation of privacy because of the regulations accompanying 
participation in school sports (preseason physicals, minimum grade point averages), as well as the 
public exposure inherent in being a part of a team (changing in the locker rooms, communal 
showering, etc.).155   
Further, the Court found the invasiveness of the sample-collecting method “negligible.”156  
Because the students provided the specimens either from a urinal or a bathroom stall, the 
“conditions are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms.”157  Although 
the majority expressed concern that the school required the disclosure of medication information 
prior to testing, the Justices noted that such concerns did not present a significant infringement: 
while precedent holds that it is favorable to not disclose prescription data until after a positive test 
result, the Court never held that “requiring advance disclosure of medications is per se 
unreasonable.”158   
Ultimately, the Court found that the government’s interest in deterring drug use among 
students is as weighty as deterring the same among Customs officials involved in drug interdiction, 
and engineers operating locomotives.  The majority reasoned that middle- and high-school aged 
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children are already especially susceptible to the psychological and physiological effects of drugs, 
and the added concern of impaired students physically injuring one another while partaking in a 
school sporting event further solidified the school district’s grave interest.159  Moreover, the Court 
found the program to be effective because it merely tested the school’s student athletes, who 
heavily influenced drug and alcohol use among the student body generally.160  Based on the 
students’ decreased expectation of privacy, the program’s narrow tailoring and minimal level of 
intrusion, and the strong government interest at hand, the Veronia School District’s drug screening 
policy was upheld as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.161 
4.     Chandler v. Miller 
In 1997, the Supreme Court rounded out its approach to employee drug testing when it handed 
down Chandler v. Miller.162  In Chandler, the Georgia Legislature enacted a statute that required 
candidates running for state office to test negatively for drugs within thirty days of qualifying for 
nomination or election.163  The plaintiffs, Libertarian party nominees, filed suit to enjoin the 
program for violating their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.164  Following the 
decisions in Skinner, Von Raab and Veronia, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s denial 
of the injunction, finding that political officials were “vested with the highest executive authority 
to make public policy,” and as such, required “the highest levels of honesty, clear-sightedness, and 
clear-thinking.”165 
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offices: governor or lieutenant governor, state Attorney General, state court judge, district attorney, and Public Service 
Commission member). 
164 Id. at 310. 
165 Id. at 311. 
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For the first time in the Court’s drug testing case history, it held that the statute violated the 
candidates’ Fourth Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the test was 
minimally invasive: the government tested only for the presence of drugs, the candidates controlled 
the release of their results, and testing took place in a doctor’s office of their choosing. 166  
Nevertheless, Georgia had not set forth a “sufficiently vital” special need to test: although abusing 
drugs and/or alcohol is incompatible with the proper discharge of public functions, the Court held 
that incompatibility alone is not a special governmental need.167   
The majority also noted that the conditions that weighed toward a finding of reasonableness in 
prior cases were not present in Chandler, such as “a demonstrated problem of drug abuse,”168 the 
inability to monitor the employees daily to garner an individualized suspicion,169 and the existence 
of “high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks.”170  As such, the Court concluded that Georgia’s need was not 
special, but rather “symbolic,” and opined that diminishing individual privacy for the sake of a 
symbol is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent.171 
B.     Framework 
The guidance provided by Skinner, Von Raab, Acton, and Chandler demonstrates that when a 
search is conducted for reasons besides ordinary law enforcement needs, it is a “special need.”172  
Such a need dispenses with the traditional requirements of a warrant and probable cause to search 
an individual.  Accordingly, to determine the reasonableness of the search, the court must balance 
the government’s interest in testing against the employee’s privacy interests.  Some of the factors 
                                                        
166 Id. at 309, 310, 312.  
167 Id. at 318.  
168 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.  
169 Id. at 316. 
170 Id. at 321–322.  The Court distinguished this case from Skinner and Von Raab by emphasizing that politicians do 
not genuinely endanger public safety through their actions.  Id. at 323.   
171 Id. at 322.  
172 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 610 (1989) (internal citations omitted).  
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that the Court has considered in this determination include: whether the employee performs safety-
sensitive duties; whether the employee works in a highly regulated field; whether the industry 
currently faces a drug and/or alcohol use problem; how much the test intrudes upon privacy 
interests; and whether the government interest is in the health and safety of employees and/or third 
parties, or a symbolic interest in a drug free appearance.  
V. Drug Testing HCWs Would Not Violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens “to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”173  The Supreme Court has held 
that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against . . . 
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.”174  In Acton, the 
Supreme Court clarified that testing administered or mandated by states triggers the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment because the Bill of Rights is incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to apply to state and local governments.175  Accordingly, should a state adopt a statute 
mandating the drug testing of HCWs, as Proposition 46 and the original HB-597 proposed to do, 
the statute would be subject to the Fourth Amendment because employers would be acting at the 
direction of the state government.176  Further, the tests qualify as searches because the Skinner 
Court held that subjecting individuals to breathalyzer tests and urinalysis is an intrusion on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that implicates the Fourth Amendment.177 
As seen in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, workplace drug and alcohol testing is motivated 
by a “special need,” such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required to lawfully test.178  
                                                        
173 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
174 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614. 
175 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (“We have held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends 
this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers.”). 
176 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614. 
177 Id. at 616. 
178 Id. at 620.  
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Because the model testing statute would not aim primarily to release test results to law 
enforcement, but instead to ascertain and deter impairment among physicians, such a statute would 
be motivated by a “special need.”179  Thus, the reasonableness of the statute would be determined 
by balancing the competing interests of the government and the individual.  
A.     The State Interest Inquiry 
Assessing the government’s interest in drug testing entails considering both the nature and the 
immediacy of the state’s need to test, and the efficacy of the means by which the government 
achieves that goal.180 
1.     The Nature and Immediacy of the State’s Need to Test 
The nature of the government concern at issue is the undeniably important interest in protecting 
the public, and the concern is immediate because of the safety-sensitive tasks performed by HCWs, 
as well as the hard-to-monitor drug-filled environment in which they work.  To begin with, there 
is one common thread uniting HCWs, U.S. Customs officers, and railroad employees that weighs 
heavily in favor of the permissibility of testing HCWs: the safety-sensitive nature of the 
professionals’ duties.  The Skinner Court acknowledged the danger accompanying drug or alcohol 
use by the general population, but went on to state, “it is a separate and far more dangerous wrong 
to perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of these substances.”181  An inebriated 
train operator can derail a train and cause multiple fatalities.  An impaired and armed U.S. Customs 
official in an airport can fire at a civilian, or an addicted officer can fall prey to bribery by a drug 
                                                        
179 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.10 (referring to 49 C.F.R. § 40 as governing the privacy and confidentiality of the 
proposed testing).  49 C.F.R. § 40.321 prohibits employers from releasing an employee’s test results without his 
written consent—adopting this aspect of the DOT regulations demonstrates that California’s primary motivation in 
implementing the PPSA is a special need, not regular criminal evidence gathering).  49 C.F.R. § 40.321.  
180 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 654, 659, 660 (in assessing the reasonableness of the school’s drug testing policy, the 
Supreme Court weighed, against the student’s privacy interest, the character of the intrusion, the nature and the 
immediacy of the government concern at issue, and the efficacy of the policy in meeting the school’s end).  
181 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.  
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smuggler and endanger our safety by introducing more contraband into our country.  The threat 
posed by a drugged HCW, while dangerous on a smaller scale, is more immediate and arguably 
more likely than the threats posed by the aforementioned professionals, since the health and safety 
of the patient is more proximately linked to the actions of the HCW—and some courts have held 
just that.  
In Kemp v. Claiborne County Hospital, the Southern District of Mississippi found the drug 
testing of a scrub nurse reasonable because of the direct risks she posed to her patients.182  The 
Kemp court focused on the safety-sensitive nature of the nurse’s job, and found “the ‘immediacy’ 
of the threat posed to the public” by the impaired employee to be “the most salient factor.”183  
Thus, although it would be rare for a drunk HCW to endanger the lives of multiple people,184 it is 
undeniable that a HCW poses a more immediate and likely threat to his patient when operating 
under the influence than the threat posed by a train conductor.  
In a case out of the Northern District of California, American Federation of Government 
Employees L-2110 v. Derwinski, the district court upheld the random testing policy implemented 
by the Veteran’s Association Hospital due to “the possibility of catastrophic accident” that 
accompanies direct patient contact.185  The plaintiff HCWs who sued to enjoin the testing program 
included a Clinical Specialist Pharmacist, a licensed graduate nurse, a Medical Technologist, a 
physician-pathologist, and a Dialysis Unit supervisor.186  It is key that, like the plaintiff nurse in 
Kemp, some of these employees had very little opportunity to erroneously operate on a patient or 
prescribe a fatal dosage of a drug.  Nonetheless, the Derwinski court found that all of the plaintiffs 
                                                        
182 Kemp v. Claiborne County Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362 (SD Miss. 1991).  
183 Id. at 1367 (citing American Federation of Government Employees v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp 294, 300 (D. D.C. 
1990)).  
184 Although rare for a doctor to harm more than one person at once, it is certainly possible—should an impaired 
doctor fail to vaccinate a child or expose a patient to a contagious disease, he may very well cause an epidemic.  
185 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
186 Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at 1495-1497.  
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had “active patient care responsibilities, either directly or in the providing of necessary diagnostic 
or therapeutic care to patients,” and such care, even if it amounted to only five percent of an 
employee’s time, justified testing for impairment.187   
Thus, the safety-sensitive nature of HCWs’ duties plainly points to a serious government 
interest in testing: while the threatened danger to a patient depends on the type of medicine 
involved and the level of direct patient contact, HCWs can endanger a life by providing any kind 
of care to patients.  Moreover, while U.S. Customs officials and railroad employees may often 
work in small groups, a doctor, for example, usually tends to a patient on a one-on-one basis save 
for a nurse, decreasing the chance of a third party’s stepping in to prevent or correct his erratic 
behavior or poor judgment.  Consequently, based on case law pertaining to drug testing HCWs, as 
well as a comparison of the threats HCWs and the tested employees in the Skinner-Von Raab line 
of cases pose, it is irrefutable that medical professionals occupy a safety-sensitive occupation.  
A second factor that weighs in favor of the government interest in drug testing HCWs is the 
importance of the interest itself: ensuring patient safety by deterring the use of drugs and/or alcohol 
at work, and ascertaining and eliminating the causes of medical error.188  Because the aim of a 
HCW’s occupation is to affect the condition of a patient’s body, it is not difficult to imagine that 
an inebriated HCW could harm a patient due to a lapse in judgment—for example, a drunken 
doctor could leave in the middle of an open heart surgery to go out to lunch, or could so badly 
                                                        
187 Id. at 1498 (holding that a licensed graduate nurse was lawfully subject to testing even though she had no access 
to narcotic drugs, did not handle surgical instruments, and only “devote[d] five percent or less of her time to patient 
care,” because that fraction of time was “significant . . . considering the importance of the care then rendered.”).  
Hence, the Court seemed to adopt the majority’s position in Skinner that certain duties are so dangerous “that even a 
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.”  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.  
188 Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Landmark Patient Safety Act Qualifies for 
November California Ballot (May 15, 2014), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-
watchdog-campaign-landmark-patient-safety-act-qualifies-november-california-bal. These motivations, then, are 
very similar to the government interests advanced in Skinner. See discussion supra Part IIIA.  
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handle a delivery that a woman is left a quadriplegic.189  The data and reports of impaired HCWs190 
demonstrate that the interest in testing is not merely “symbolic,” like Georgia’s interest in 
Chandler, but rather is a concrete problem that needs a solution.191   
The Acton Court upheld the testing of student athletes because athletes who are impaired while 
playing a sport may harm a teammate or opponent—certainly the concern that a HCW, wielding 
surgical tools or a prescription pad, will harm a patient under his care is just as strong as the fear 
that a high soccer player will run into a teammate on the field.  Further, the Derwinski court 
recognized the interests in testing hospital employees as ensuring the integrity of the workers, and 
enhancing public safety.192  The district court held that maintaining the integrity of the medical 
profession is “of paramount concern” because hospitals “exist precisely for [the] purpose” of 
ensuring the safety of the members of the public who seek medical attention.193  The Supreme 
Court reached a similar conclusion in Von Raab in finding the testing of U.S. Customs officials 
necessary to ensure the officers’ commitment to the mission at hand.194  Thus, while this interest 
may seem to mirror Chandler’s symbolic interest, the gravity of the duties performed distinguishes 
                                                        
189 Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, California Ballot Initiative Will Enact Nation’s First Law Requiring Random 
Drug Testing of Physicians, says Consumer Watchdog Campaign (Apr. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-california-ballot-initiative-will-
enact-nation’s-first-law-re.  The patient who was left on the operating table while his drunken doctor stepped out for 
lunch is in a permanent vegetative state as a result of his physician’s negligence.  Id.  The patient whose intoxicated 
doctor used forceps in her delivery is paralyzed from the neck down because her doctor stretched her neck and spinal 
cord “like taffy.”  Id.  See also Edward J. Boyer, Girls Wins $21 Million in Malpractice Suit, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 
1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-02/local/me-1814_1_spinal-cord-injury (explaining that in the doctor’s 
malpractice suit, the patient’s attorney alleged that the two doctors who cared for the patient after her delivery “entered 
a conspiracy of silence” in protecting the defendant despite the clear evidence of his medical negligence and instead 
told her family that she “had a hereditary disease and would die in a few months.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
190 See discussion supra Part III. 
191 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (stating that while there need not be a documented problem of 
substance abuse among the profession, such a finding helps “shore up” the need for government involvement). 
192 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1991).  
193 Id. 
194 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 (1989). 
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the interest in upholding a doctor’s ethical obligation to remain sober while treating a patient from 
a mere desire to show a commitment to a drug-free workplace.  
Finally, the government interest in testing HCWs is particularly strong because of the nature 
of their work environment.  The Von Raab Court noted that Customs officials are on the front lines 
of drug interdiction, so an impaired or addicted employee may be seduced by the sizeable stash of 
drugs under their control.195  This concern also applies to HCWs, who have access to an abundance 
of addictive drugs.  The proximity to drugs is certainly a temptation to overwhelmed HCWs, and 
only seems to enable addictions and provide breeding grounds for medical negligence.196  In fact, 
the Derwinski court took note of the fact that, like U.S. Customs agents, medical employees work 
in a unique environment with its own temptations, and held that “the propinquity to drugs is 
therefore a factor to be weighed in the balance.”197  Consequently, based on the demonstrated 
problem of drug- and alcohol-impaired HCWs causing harm to patients, the special responsibilities 
these professionals carry out, and the unique environment in which they work, states have a 
significant interest in testing HCWs.  
2.     The Efficacy of the Testing Program, and the Character of the Intrusion   
Two other factors that a state must prove before it can drug test HCWs are how effective a 
testing program will be in uncovering and deterring drug and alcohol use among medical 
employees, and how much the program infringes upon the privacy of medical professionals. 
Based on the evidence speaking to the high rate of drug and alcohol abuse among HCWs and 
the “culture of silence” permeating the medical field, 198 to effectively address a state’s interest in 
                                                        
195 Id. at 669. 
196 Berge, supra note 37, at 625 (describing a 2009 article published by the Mayo Clinic recounting the findings of a 
five-year study of doctors in physician health programs, and its conclusion that one of the contributing factors to the 
use of drugs is the “ready access to narcotics and other psychotropic drugs in the workplace.”). 
197 Derwinski, 777 F. Supp at 1499. 
198 See discussion supra Part III.   
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protecting patients, a drug testing program is clearly necessary.  First, there is a documented 
problem of substance abuse among HCWs nationwide.199  In upholding the railroad’s testing 
program, the Skinner Court noted the problem of drug and alcohol use by railroad employees.200  
Likewise, the Acton Court opined that the school’s program was appropriately tailored to address 
its drug problem because the individuals to be tested were the “leaders of the drug culture.”201  
Thus, although proof of a demonstrated substance abuse problem is not a necessary predicate for 
testing, 202  the presence of such a problem among HCWs reveals the need for some sort of 
government involvement to protect third parties.  
Both the PPSA and the original HB-597 pushed for random drug testing to deter drug and 
alcohol use among HCWs, and to ascertain the source of medical error due to such impairment.203  
But the two acts differed in their breadth.  For example, the PPSA aimed to randomly drug test all 
“physicians” with admitting privileges at a hospital, whether that physician is an employee or an 
independent contractor, and regardless of his specific area of medicine.204  On the other hand, the 
original New Hampshire Bill was even broader than the PPSA because it aimed to tie the state 
licensure of health care facilities to their creation of a mandatory random drug testing program: if 
the facility did not test each worker at least four times a year, its license would be suspended.205  
Because HB-597 was enacted in response to the drug diversion of a medical technician as opposed 
to a physician, the act would have tested all workers, and not just certain physicians.206  Although 
                                                        
199 Eisler, supra note 44 (citing a 2007 report by the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
which stated that “an average of 103,000 doctors, nurses, medical technicians and health care aides a year were abusing 
or dependent on illicit drugs”). 
200 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 607–608 (1989). 
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204 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.15(e) (defining a “physician” as “a holder of a physician and surgeon’s certificate” 
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 35 
the empirical data cited above207 seems to apply more to doctors, the model testing policy cannot 
be so limited because patients can be harmed by the Mr. Kwiatkowskis of the world just as much 
as by the Dr. Duntschs.  
Secondly, in upholding the U.S. Customs Service’s policy, the Von Raab Court emphasized 
that Customs officials were our nation’s “first line of defense” against the introduction of 
contraband into the country.208  To some degree, then, the Court found it important that the public 
relied on Customs officials to protect our borders, which made it reasonable to ensure (by testing) 
that the employees possessed their full faculties while carrying out their duties.209  In the same 
sense, HCWs owe their patients those same fiduciary duties—members of the public rely on 
medical professionals to take care of their mental and physical well being, such that it is reasonable 
to randomly test HCWs to ensure their sobriety.    
Further, the seriousness of the work HCWs perform warrants departure from the requirement 
of individualized suspicion to test.  The Skinner Court held that as to railroad employees, requiring 
an employer to prove an individualized suspicion following an adverse event would impede his 
ability to ascertain the cause of the accident and quickly remove the impaired employees 
responsible.210  Moreover, the Court held that it would be reasonable to randomly test because it 
provides a more effective deterrent among the employees.211  For the same reasons, testing HCWs 
randomly is an effective way to deter drug and alcohol use, and to protect patients by ascertaining 
and removing impaired medical employees.212  
                                                        
207 See discussion supra Part III. 
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209 Id. at 670.  
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 36 
Allowing suspicionless drug testing in the medical profession is not only wise in theory, it is 
also warranted based on the culture of the field today.  Many advocates in the medical field have 
spoken out about the need for suspicionless testing in the profession based on their personal 
experience with substance abuse or with addicted colleagues.213  For example, Dr. Stephen Loyd, 
a doctor of internal medicine practicing in Tennessee, has revealed that although he was heavily 
addicted to narcotics while practicing, taking up to 100 pills a day, none of his colleagues ever 
reported him or intervened despite his erratic behavior and decreased worked quality.214  Similarly, 
an article published by the Mayo Foundation acknowledges the difficulty in getting help for 
doctors, even though their rate of abusing drugs and/or alcohol is equal to, if not greater than, the 
rate of abuse among the general population, because “a physician’s family members and coworkers 
will often participate in a ‘conspiracy of silence’ in an effort to protect the family or practice 
workers from economic ruin by the loss of the physician’s job and income.”215  It is quite plain, 
then, that the unwillingness to report a HCW is not limited to Dr. Loyd and his colleagues, but 
medical employees across the country.216  
Moreover, a doctor’s office or hospital surely fits within the non-traditional office environment 
discussed in Von Raab.  For instance, doctors mostly work alone or with just one other medical 
professional when treating a patient.217  Further, HCWs as a class frequently work for lengthy 
                                                        
213 See Consumer Watchdog, supra note 35; Levinson, supra note 84; Ken Murray, How to Deal with Doctors Who 
Get Drunk and High on the Job, TIME (June 19, 2014), http://time.com/2901422/doctors-drunk-high/ (calling for a 
legislative attempt at mandating testing because “patient safety concerns justify such testing for physicians”); Julius 
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“was supposed to be a simple procedure” that a doctor would ordinarily perform alone).  
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periods of time, so their colleagues might misinterpret signs of impairment as signs of fatigue 
associated with working such long hours.  The ambiguity of the indicators of substance use, the 
infrequent contact with other colleagues, and the culture of silence within the medical profession 
all point to the impracticability of relying on this atypical work environment to garner an 
individualized suspicion of impairment on the job.  As such, a testing policy that aims to eradicate 
and deter drug use among HCWs must feature random testing. 
Finally, the state must prove that the invasiveness of the suggested testing procedure is justified 
given its interest in testing, as well as the efficacy of the chosen methods.  The Skinner Court noted 
that while blood, breath and urine tests are all physical intrusions of the body, they are negligible 
because they mirror the testing done during a visit to the doctor’s office, reveal nothing more than 
the presence of drugs and/or alcohol (urine and blood), and can be done with minimal 
embarrassment or inconvenience (breath). 218   Further, the American Society of Addiction 
Medicine reports that urine testing is the most common form of drug testing because it is most 
familiar, is the least expensive to analyze, and can include a range of drugs on a test panel, while 
breath testing is the standard means for testing a person for alcohol impairment.219 
Moreover, the program set forth in the PPSA followed the FAA drug testing guidelines, which 
courts have upheld as posing a minimal threat of intrusiveness.220  The guidelines do not require 
direct observation of the employee providing the sample—typically, the testing atmosphere 
mirrors the public bathroom experience, or an annual physical examination. 221   Such an 
environment presents a “negligible” invasion of privacy according to the Acton court.222  Further, 
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the FAA program does not test the urine sample for anything but the presence of specifically 
enumerated drugs: opiates, marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines and phencyclidine.223  In the event 
that a urine or breath sample indicates the presence of drugs and/or alcohol, a second test is done 
to confirm the positive finding.224  Even upon confirmation, the results are not reported to the 
employer until a licensed physician analyzes the results in conjunction with medical information 
provided by the employee to find a legal explanation for the positive result.225  Finally, the results 
of the test are sent to the employer alone, and may not be disseminated without the employee’s 
consent.226 
B.     The Individual Interest in Privacy 
The final step in assessing the reasonableness of a testing program is weighing the individual 
privacy interest that is threatened.  As mentioned in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, urinalysis 
and breath samples are Fourth Amendment searches that invade one’s bodily and informational 
privacy.227  As the Fifth Circuit noted in Von Raab, urinating is an activity that society recognizes 
as private,228 and while obtaining breath samples does not require an invasion of privacy in the 
same way, it could embarrass the employee and be inconvenient.229  Further, employees have an 
interest in shielding their biological, physiological and medical information from others—a urine 
                                                        
223  49 C.F.R. § 40.85 (explaining that the DOT regulations only test for the presence of drugs, respecting the 
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test could reveal information beyond just the presence of drugs, such as whether the employee is 
diabetic or pregnant.230   
Accordingly, while the privacy interest threatened in providing breath and/or urine samples is 
not insignificant, the individuals subject to testing, HCWs, have a diminished reasonable 
expectation of privacy because their profession is heavily regulated and/or is inherently 
dangerous.231  Like the railroad industry, the medical profession is heavily regulated, although 
mostly at the state level.232  Doctors, for example, cannot practice until completing years of 
schooling and internships, and acquiring a state license to work within its borders.233  Once a 
physician obtains his license, he is subject to regulation by the state medical board, which derives 
its power to supervise licensing, examinations and disciplinary procedures from the state 
legislature.234  For example, the Medical Board of California’s website provides visitors a 104-
page PDF document that describes the laws governing the practice of medicine within the state, 
from general licensing to ordering controlled substances.235  It appears, then, that the medical field 
is as highly regulated as the railroad industry, leaving physicians with a decreased expectation of 
privacy.   
Further, in upholding the Veteran Hospital’s testing program, the Derwinski court took a page 
out of Von Raab and remarked that “those held out as medical professionals” have an “aura of 
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assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician.page? (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).  
234 Haas-Wilson, supra note 232. 
235 MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, GUIDE TO THE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BY PHYSICIANS 
AND SURGEONS (7th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/About_Us/Laws/laws_guide.pdf. 
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professional competence,” such that it is unlikely for such an employee to “reasonably hold the 
same expectation of privacy as that entertained by a clerical worker or other non-professional 
employee in federal service.”236  Because providing medical care is as regulated as operating a 
train, and as dangerous as handling a firearm to protect our borders, albeit dangerous on a smaller 
scale in terms of potential casualties, individuals who voluntarily choose to occupy these positions 
must make do with their diminished expectation of privacy.237  
This analysis balancing the employee-HCW’s privacy interest against the state’s interest in 
testing the HCW for impairment demonstrates that it would not violate the Fourth Amendment for 
a state to adopt a statute mandating testing for HCWs.  Specifically, the nature and immediacy of 
the government’s interest, the efficacy of testing, and the character of the intrusion all buttress the 
state’s interest in testing HCWs for drugs and/or alcohol to protect the public.  
VI.     Model Statute: The Guideposts to Include Within a Statute Mandating HCW Drug Testing 
Taking into consideration drug testing precedent, as well as California and New Hampshire’s 
attempts to mandate such testing, this Comment proposes some guideposts that a model statute 
would include to ensure a constitutional, effective, and fair testing program.238  Such a statute 
would: specifically enumerate the chosen procedure; include pre-employment, random, suspicion-
based, adverse event, return-to-duty and follow-up testing; test all HCWs; provide swift 
consequences that are tailored to the infraction; and would provide for a comprehensive approach 
                                                        
236  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1499 (N.D. Cal. 1991).  The court also 
remarked that the grave “life and death” atmosphere in which a physician carries out his duties necessarily means he 
holds “a lesser expectation of privacy in [his] ability to provide the services necessary to perform [his] duties.”  Id. 
237 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (“Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a 
closely regulated industry, students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions 
upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
238 See also Pham & Provonost, supra note 213 (setting forth “the key principles of a program for physician drug 
testing,” which include: 1) a focus on identification and rehabilitation rather than punishment; 2) confidentiality; 3) 
mandatory pre-employment, pre-appointment or pre-licensure testing; 4) random testing; 5) for-cause testing, such as 
adverse event testing; and 6) initially limiting testing programs to a hospital setting, “where the bylaws and 
infrastructure can support the program.”).  
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to a drug-free work environment, by supporting state physician health programs, require medical 
schools to test students and educate them on the danger of impairment, and enact a whistleblower 
law to encourage professionals in the medical field to refer colleagues for help. 
A.     The Statute Must Delineate the Specifics 
In its attempt to mandate physician drug testing, the PPSA provided hospitals with a ready-
made policy to implement. 239   The advantage of taking the initiative in this manner is the 
confidence that comes with creating a constitutional testing program.240  The FAA regulations pose 
a minimal threat of invading an employee’s privacy; not only do they ensure bodily (by not 
requiring direct observation) and informational (by limiting the use of the test results) privacy, but 
also they provide the test administrators with little, if any, discretion in carrying out their duties to 
ensure that the employee’s privacy is respected.241  In adopting the FAA guidelines, the PPSA 
likewise promised physicians minimal invasiveness in implementing the procedure. 
On the other hand, HB-597 did not specifically provide a testing program for employer-health 
care facilities, but merely mandated that the employers establish and implement “a mandatory 
random drug testing program,” leaving the specifics up to the facility itself.242  Thus, the original 
HB-597 left the method of collecting the samples to the facility’s discretion—it could adopt a 
urinalysis testing program if it felt that urinalysis would be more cost-effective, or a blood or hair 
sample program if it felt that such a program would be more accurate.   
While it might be helpful to have a universal method of testing among the state’s health care 
facilities, there are benefits to allowing each facility to adopt its own procedure: the facilities can 
                                                        
239 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 4.  
240 Bluestein v. DOT, 908 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1990). (rejecting the constitutional challenge to the FAA testing 
program for lack of a meaningful distinction between the Fourth Amendment issues in this case and in Von Raab).  
See also discussion infra Part IVB.  
241 Id. at 457.  See also discussion infra Part IVB. 
242 H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013). 
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do their own cost-benefit analyses and find economically feasible, yet effective, plans.  It is key to 
note, though, that if a statute is to mandate that facilities adopt their own policies (HB-597) as 
opposed to provide a universal program (PPSA), it is important to define the terms that apply to 
all facilities (i.e., the tests must still be “random” and must be done “X” number of times per year, 
etc.).  
B.     Forms of Suggested Testing 
 
1.     HCWs Should Be Tested Pre-Employment, Randomly, After an Adverse Event, Upon a 
Reasonable Suspicion, and After Returning to Duty from Treatment 
 
Based on the incidence of drug and alcohol use among medical professionals and the failure 
of the system’s current policy of self-regulation, drug testing is necessary to ascertain and deter 
drug use in the field.  Of the two proposed pieces of legislation discussed in this Comment, only 
Proposition 46 set forth a testing procedure to apply to all hospitals throughout the state.  
Specifically, the PPSA suggested that physicians be drug tested according to the FAA testing 
regulations, which cross-referenced the DOT procedures for testing employees in the 
transportation sectors that are subject to federal regulation.243   For our purposes, the HCWs 
because the regulations aim to test employees pre-employment, randomly, following an adverse 
event, upon a reasonable suspicion of impairment, when an employee returns to duty, and to 
follow-up with the employee’s progress once he rejoins the workforce.244 
                                                        
243  Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, http://www.dot.gov/odapc/part40 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  While the FAA specifies its own 
rules for aviation employees under 14 C.F.R. § 120, it belongs to a group of federal agencies that are governed by the 
DOT, and thus largely refers to the DOT’s own provisions.  DOT Agency Information, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, http://www.dot.gov/odapc/agencies (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).   
244 49 C.F.R. § 40.14(h) (2012).  See also An Employer’s Guide to Drug Testing in Montana, MONT. DEP’T OF LABOR 
AND INDUS, http://wsd.dli.mt.gov/service/drugmanuala.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (explaining that a return-to-
duty test is administered when an employee violates the applicable drug and alcohol regulations, including failing to 
submit a sample, while a follow-up test is administered when an employee has previously tested positive for a 
controlled substance).  
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The DOT testing program is very careful about respecting employee privacy: for example, the 
regulations require that the collector of the sample not be able to link the employee with his sample, 
result, or report. 245   Also, under § 40.61, test administrators are prohibited from asking the 
employee to list the medications he is currently taking.246  Section 40.41 states that the preferred 
type of testing facility is a single-toilet room with a full-length privacy door, or a multi-stall 
restroom with a door providing “substantial visual privacy.”247  Likewise, the policy requires that 
breathalyzer tests be administered in a way that provides the employee “visual and aural privacy” 
from others besides the test administrator and a DOT agency representative.248  Further, both the 
urinalysis and breathalyzer tests require a confirmatory test upon a positive result for either 
substance.249  Finally, the DOT procedures prohibit an employer from releasing an employee’s 
results or medical information without the latter’s specific written consent.250   
The regulations, then, set out a minimally intrusive method of testing by not requiring direct 
observation or disclosure of medical information until a positive result is confirmed, two factors 
that weighed toward a finding of constitutionality in Von Raab,251  and by providing testing 
facilities similar to public restrooms, which the Acton Court looked upon favorably.252   
                                                        
245 49 C.F.R. § 40.31.  
246 Id. § 40.61. 
247 Id. § 40.41. 
248 Id. § 40.221. 
249 Id. § 40.221 for alcohol testing; id. § 40.87 for urine. 
250 49 C.F.R. § 40.321.   
251 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 n.2 (1989).  See also 49 C.F. R. § 40.67 (specifying 
that a direct observation may be done only if an employee shows an intent to, or does, tamper with the sample, or is 
subject to return-to-duty or follow-up testing.  Such an observation is done without advance notice to the employee, 
ensuring the effectiveness of the testing, unlike in Chandler, and gives collectors little discretion to require such testing 
on their own).  
252 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).   
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The FAA regulations,253 which served as the model for the PPSA program, require a full range 
of testing of all employees in safety-sensitive positions: 254  pre-employment, random, post-
accident, reasonable cause, return to duty, and follow-up testing.255  Likewise, the FAA regulations 
have a more detailed scheme for alcohol testing.  While all safety-sensitive employees are tested 
for alcohol,256 certain employees are prohibited from working with a BAC over 0.04, and from 
drinking within eight hours of performing their duties.257  
As for consequences, § 40.191 of the DOT regulations provides that a failure to “cooperate 
with any part of the testing process,” even failing to empty one’s pockets, constitutes a refusal to 
take a test and triggers consequences such as suspension from work.258  Specifically, §§ 120.11, 
120.13, and 120.15 of the FAA program state that pilots, flight crewmembers, and other airmen 
are subject to drug testing, and their refusal to test results in a one-year suspension or revocation 
of their licenses.259   
Further, the FAA provides for strict consequences for positive test results.  Under § 120.11, an 
employee with two positive drug test results is permanently disqualified from performing his 
safety-sensitive duties “prior to the second drug test.”260  If a test result demonstrates that an 
employee performed that duty while impaired, his employer will also permanently disqualify him 
                                                        
253 14 C.F.R. § 120 (2009).  
254  Industry Drug and Alcohol Testing Program, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/drug_alcohol/ (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015). 
255 14 CFR §§ 120.109, 120.217.  See also 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.35 (requiring random, referral and post-
adverse event testing, but stating that a physician who has been put on probation for impairment cannot have his 
license reinstated until he “demonstrates to the Board’s satisfaction that he or she is fit to return to duty,” suggesting 
the requirement of return-to-duty and follow-up testing to demonstrate such “fitness”).  
256 14 CFR §§ 120.105, 120.215.  See also 14 CFR § 120.19 (prohibiting employees from drinking within eight 
hours after an accident in which they performed a safety-sensitive function).  
257 14 C.F.R. §§ 120.19(d), 120.37(d).  
258 49 C.F.R. § 40.191 (2012).  
259 14 C.F.R. §§ 120.11, 120.13, 120.15. 
260 14 C.F.R. § 120.11. 
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from that position. 261   When an employee engages in alcohol-related misconduct, he is 
immediately removed from his safety-sensitive position, and permanently disqualified following 
his first incident of on-duty alcohol use, or his second violation of any alcohol-related rule under 
§§ 120.19 or 120.37.262   
Based on this analysis, it seems that the PPSA provided a constitutionally reasonable test to 
apply to HCWs, as well as an adequate starting point for drafting a model testing statute.  The 
DOT policy implements safeguards for employee privacy pursuant to the Skinner-Von Raab line 
of cases, such as preferring a public restroom atmosphere rather than direct observation, ensuring 
that the collector does not know the employee,263 and testing solely for the presence of drugs and 
alcohol.264  Further, the FAA guidelines would adequately protect third parties from the risks posed 
by impaired physicians: the strict consequences triggered when an employee is found to be under 
the influence at work supply a promising deterrent for HCWs, and the immediate removal of such 
an employee satisfactorily ensures patient safety.  Accordingly, although the PPSA failed to 
become law, its proposed adoption of the FAA regulations for testing physicians seems to be an 
appropriate fit, and the model testing program would do well to adopt the FAA, or any other DOT-
based, drug testing regulations.   
2.     Random Testing is a Necessary Component of any Model Testing Statute 
                                                        
261 14 CFR § 120.111. 
262 14 CFR § 120.221. 
263 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626–27 (1989) (explaining that the railroad’s test is 
minimally intrusive because the sample was collected “by personnel unrelated to the railroad employer,” making it 
“not unlike similar procedures encountered” when getting an annual physical).  See also 14 C.F.R. § 40.31 (providing 
that the collector cannot be the immediate supervisor, unless nobody else is available, and the collector must not be 
able to link the employee with his test result, sample, or report).   
264 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. 
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Although this form of testing has proved most controversial, random testing is indispensable 
to an effective testing program.265  The medical field is, and has been, self-regulating,266 and a 
desire to remain so is understandable because only HCWs can understand “the complexity of 
medical tasks,” the nature of their work, and the standards to which such professionals should be 
held.267  On the other hand, because HCWs understand so well the stress and the years of hard 
work, they also may be more forgiving of their colleagues who fall prey to addiction, or even those 
who sometimes come to work intoxicated.268  Consequently, 33% of physicians fail to report their 
colleagues 269  which is “something of an embarrassment” to the profession, and entirely 
unacceptable to the public.270  Further, where physician health programs do exist, they may be less 
proactive than they should be in detecting impaired physicians, which means, “by default, that 
patient harm has to occur before a review process occurs,” and often, “an overwhelming amount 
of data (i.e., harmed patients) must be available before a hospital or state initiates an 
investigation.”271  
Perhaps, then, it is time to break from the status quo and adopt another method of regulation.  
While testing in other forms (based on a random suspicion, following an adverse event, etc.) is 
necessary, it would not be sufficient to ensure patient safety.  For example, relying on referrals 
                                                        
265 Ejnes, supra note 18 at 912 (“Despite our professional obligation to report impaired colleagues, we have been 
reluctant to do so. Thus, as advocated by others, effective programs to detect and prevent physician impairment may 
require a limited amount of mandatory drug and alcohol testing.”).  
266 Pham & Provonost, supra note 213 at 913 (“Traditionally, impaired physicians are identified through self-policing 
of professional norms, with impaired physicians identifying themselves or being identified by their colleagues.”). 
267  Matthew K. Wynia, MD, MPH, The Role of Professionalism and Self-Regulation in Detecting Impaired or 
Incompetent Physicians, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 210, 210 (2010).  
268 Pham & Provonost, supra note 213 at 913–14 (“Physicians are often reticent to identify their colleagues, even in 
the face of clear evidence of impairment or abuse.”).  
269 Cynthia A. Lien, A Need to Establish Programs to Detect and Prevent Drug Diversion, 87 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 607, 
607 (2012).  
270 Abramson, supra note 7, at 12.  
271 Pham et. al., supra note 213, at 2101.  
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from colleagues to test an employee is simply ineffective due to the culture of silence in the 
medical field, which prevents physicians from reporting an impaired doctor.272   
Relying on a reasonable suspicion alone to test employees for drugs and/or alcohol would be 
ineffective because of the discretion inherent in such a judgment.  The DOT regulations allow 
employers to test upon a reasonable suspicion, which is defined as a supervisor’s “determination 
based upon specific, contemporaneous, articulable observations concerning the employee’s 
appearance, behavior, speech or body odors” that lead him to believe the employee is under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.273  Because this type of testing depends on the determination of the 
supervisor, influenced by his meager two hours of training (sixty minutes of training each for the 
indicators of alcohol use and drug use),274 it is largely discretionary.  If the supervisor chooses to 
turn a blind eye, or misses a sign of impairment, the employee simply will not be tested under this 
program.275   
For example, most of the facilities that employed Kwiatkowski had suspicion-based testing 
policies: at least one of them, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, actually tested 
Kwiatkowski, but still did not inform the ultimate authority responsible for his licensure, the 
ARRT.276  On the other hand, New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital never tested Kwiatkowski, even 
                                                        
272 Pham & Provonost, supra note 213, 913–914. 
273  The agencies covered by the DOT regulations differ slightly in how many supervisors need to witness the 
suspicious behavior before requiring a test, etc.  See DOT Agency/USCG Drug and Alcohol Program Facts, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/ODAPC_Program%20Facts.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2015).  
274  REASONABLE SUSPICION REFERRAL FOR DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING, A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR TRANSIT 
SUPERVISORS (1997) available at http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/publications/safety/ReasonableSuspicion/PDF/rf-
leader.pdf. 
275 Abramson, supra note 7, at 14.  See also Roger S. Cicala, MD, Substance Abuse Among Physicians: What You 
Need to Know, 39 HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN, 39, 42–43 (2003) (explaining that the indicators of substance abuse among 
HCWs varies based on the substance being abused: if the HCW has access to the drug through work, he maintains his 
work performance at a high level so as to stay near the drug, but works alone, takes frequent bathroom breaks, and 
often closes doors to the rooms he occupies; on the other hand, a HCW who abuses drugs obtained through other 
avenues will make work his last priority, leaving early, coming in late, and taking extended lunch hours, etc.).  
276 Abramson, supra note 7, at 11. 
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though his colleagues repeatedly told supervisors that he seemed “overly medicated” and was seen 
with white foam around his mouth.  Instead, the extent of the hospital’s disciplinary action was 
sending him home for the day and recording these behaviors in his personnel file.277 
Pre-employment testing alone will not suffice to deter medical professionals from substance 
abuse because they will anticipate the test.  Such tests condition a HCW’s employment on a 
negative drug test, giving the prospective employees notice and an opportunity to find a way to 
avoid detection.  Employees could abstain from their substance abuse for the necessary period of 
time to allow the drug to leave their system,278 dilute their urine and/or use the urine of another 
individual, or use a product available on the market to assure a negative result.279  While such 
testing at least weeds out the employees who are so addicted that they cannot even abstain for a 
test they know is coming, the data regarding currently practicing impaired medical workers280 
suggests that pre-employment testing does not capture enough of the harm-doers. 
Testing following an adverse event by definition means waiting until a patient is injured before 
stepping in to protect patients more generally.  For example, the California Health and Safety Code 
includes within its definition of “adverse event”: performing surgery on the wrong patient; death 
or disability associated with giving a patient the wrong dosage of a drug; and death or disability 
associated with using a device in patient care in a way it is not intended to be used.281  Further, 
testing a HCW after an adverse event risks the danger of a false positive: a doctor may have 
                                                        
277 Id. at 12.  
278  Approximate Detection Times Table, MAYO CLINIC, MAYO MEDICAL LABORATORIES, 
http://www.mayomedicallaboratories.com/articles/drug-book/viewall.html (last updated January 2011).  Based on this 
chart, it is possible for an employee to avoid detection by merely abstaining from drug use for one day before the 
urinalysis.  Id.  
279  Medical school drug testing is a moral and scientific failure, KEVINMD (May 11, 2014), 
http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/05/medical-school-drug-testing-moral-scientific-failure.html.  
280 See discussion supra Part III. 
281  CAL. HSC. CODE §§ 1279.1(b)(1)(B), 1279.1(b)(4)(A), 1279.1(b)(2)(B).   See also 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 
§ 2350.10(b) (adopting the definition of “adverse event” set out in the California Health and Safety Code).   
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attended a social function after his services have been rendered, or a nurse may have left for 
vacation, and is thus unable to be tested.  Will either of these professionals be penalized for their 
post-work activities, the doctor for his positive breathalyzer test, and the nurse for her “refusal” to 
provide a test sample?  If so, would medical professionals be forced to schedule work around their 
social plans to avoid being caught in such a predicament?282 
Finally, return-to-duty and follow-up testing are  necessary because they take place after an 
employee has already failed or refused to take a prior test.283  Unfortunately, because these tests 
are not administered until after an employee has already violated the testing regulations (either by 
failing a test or by being noncompliant), they do not have as much of a deterrent or preventative-
measure value as random testing. 
Based on an analysis of the range of testing available, random testing provides a different kind 
of benefit, and as such, needs to be included in any health care testing program.  Because medical 
professionals have no way of knowing, down to the day, when their test will be, they are not as 
prepared to avoid the test or alter their results, offering employees an incentive to avoid using 
drugs or alcohol, and offering employers a more effective way to pick out the employees who may 
be harming patients.  Further, because there is no discretion involved with random testing, this 
form of testing will presumably yield a more accurate reading of the medical workforce because 
supervisors will not be able to turn a blind eye to a positive result, and there is no need to rely on 
the referrals of colleagues who prefer to not get involved.  Lastly, some have argued that random 
                                                        
282 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.24(A)(2) (requiring a doctor to be tested within 12 hours of an adverse event if he 
treated the patient 24 hours before the event, necessarily limiting the operative time period to 36 hours).  But see Sam 
Levin, The Poison Pill of Proposition 46?, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/the-poison-pill-of-proposition-46/Content?oid=4079871 (quoting Richard 
Thorp, president of the California Medical Association, as saying “an adverse event may not come to light for days or 
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doctor in question was under the influence while on duty.  It could also be difficult for doctors to provide immediate 
urine samples if they are traveling or on vacation.”).  
283 MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, supra note 244.  
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testing is an ethical necessity, as it fills in the gaps, left by other forms of testing, in a health care 
institution’s ethical obligation to detect substance abusers while avoiding the “double standards 
and stigmata” of suspicion-based and pre-employment testing.284  
C.     All Health Care Workers Must be Tested 
Had the PPSA been enacted, it would have subjected all holders of a physician and surgeon’s 
certificate to testing.285  According to the California Business and Professions Code, a “holder of 
a physician and surgeon’s certificate” may prescribe medication, use devices in or upon a person, 
and/or perform surgery that would sever or penetrate human tissue.286   Thus, even specialist 
doctors in fields that generally do not require particularly risky procedures, such as dermatologists 
and podiatrists, would have been subject to testing. 
Podiatrists treat a variety of foot-related problems by prescribing drugs, setting fractures and 
performing surgery.287  Some states even license podiatrists to prescribe narcotics to treat foot 
conditions, to be administered “by any route, including intravenously,” even though “any 
medications prescribed may also have other systemic effects on the patient.”288  The fact that a 
podiatrist is able to operate on a patient and prescribe him medication alone creates the risk that 
an impaired podiatrist can seriously harm a patient.  What is more, an unlicensed assistant at the 
podiatrist’s side “cannot provide any service which constitutes the practice of podiatry,” and in 
fact is monitored by the podiatrist while in the office.289  Thus, if the podiatrist himself is under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, it seems as if the assistant will be of little help to the patient. 
                                                        
284 Levine, supra note 3, at 323.  
285 2014 Bill Text CA V. 7 § 2350.15(E).  
286 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2051. 
287  Tara Parks, DPM, The Profession of Podiatry, DEPARTMENT OF PODIATRY, BOULDER MEDICAL CENTER, 
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289 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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Likewise, dermatologists treat skin-related problems by prescribing medication, diagnosing 
certain ailments, and performing minor surgery.  For instance, when a dermatologist diagnoses 
skin cancer, he may excise the “cancer and a small amount of normal-looking skin” surrounding 
it, and typically performs the procedure right in his office,290 putting the patient in harm’s way if 
the dermatologist is impaired.  Furthermore, dermatologists as a group have generated about 86 to 
123 claims of malpractice per year, ranging from medication errors to failure to recognize a 
complication of treatment.291  
Therefore, though there is less of a chance of danger to life when doctors who don’t typically 
perform invasive procedures, like dermatologists and podiatrists, err because the nature of their 
practice is less surgically demanding, the need to test these kinds of doctors is still strong.  
Specialized physicians could still prescribe patients the wrong kind of medication, or misdiagnose 
or fail to diagnose a serious condition.  Further, while these doctors devote a minimal percentage 
of their time to procedures that can immediately impact a patient, that small amount of time, as the 
Derwinski court recognized,292 is not insignificant.  Thus, a model testing policy for HCWs would 
include all types of doctors.  
Moreover, the ideal testing program would not be limited to doctors because such a program 
would exclude nurses, medical technicians and other HCWs who can harm patients.  Courts have 
recognized this risk.  In Kemp, the Southern District of Mississippi upheld the testing of a scrub 
nurse because she held a safety-sensitive position by providing “direct, hands-on patient care, 
including bringing the patient from the hospital room to the operating room for surgery and being 
                                                        
290  Skin Cancer: Diagnosis, Treatment, and Outcome, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DERMATOLOGY, 
http://www.aad.org/dermatology-a-to-z/diseases-and-treatments/q---t/skin-cancer/diagnosis-treatment. 
291 Patient Safety, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DERMATOLOGY, http://www.aad.org/education/patient-safety. 
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present and assisting during surgery.”293  The district court found that despite her not wielding a 
surgical instrument, a scrub tech could cause the patient “irremediable harm” by allowing the 
patient to fall from a gurney, by bumping the surgeon “at a critical moment during the surgery,” 
or by failing to properly count surgical sponges.294  Similarly, the Derwinski court found the drug 
testing constitutional as applied to medical professionals across the board—physicians, 
pharmacists, nurses and medical technicians—even if they spent “five percent or less of [their] 
time” directly interacting with patients.295   
Finally, the cases of Mr. Kwiatkowski, Ms. Parker, and Mr. Beumel296 make clear that nearly 
any employee in an operating room or doctor’s office could harm a patient.  As such, the New 
Hampshire legislature was justified in proposing to test “all health care workers employed” in 
state-licensed facilities.297   
D.     Consequences Should be Swift, Yet Appropriate  
Thanks to the public debate occasioned by Proposition 46, it has become clear that the medical 
field needs to change its approach to regulating its professionals.298  While most of the necessary 
reform is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is beneficial to note some of the suggestions made 
by others in the face of the failed PPSA and HB-597.  
One of the biggest critiques of Proposition 46 is that it was just too strict: many people believed 
that the purpose of the act was to punish, rather than identify and rehabilitate, the impaired 
                                                        
293 Kemp v. Claiborne County Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (S.D. Miss. 1991).  
294 Id. at 1367–68.  
295 Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498. 
296 Levinson, supra note 84.   
297 H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013). 
298  Although medicine is a self-regulating profession, relying on state medical boards to license and discipline 
physicians, colleagues are mum when it comes to blowing the whistle, and bureaucratic boards are slow to move their 
feet.  See John Leifer, Who is Protecting Us From Bad Doctors?, THE LEIFER HEALTH CARE REPORT, (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://leiferreport.com/protecting-bad-doctors/ (quoting Inspector General Alan Levine, who oversees medical boards 
on behalf of the United States, as saying that many medical boards “serve the vested interest of physicians to a far 
greater extent than they serve the public good” by under-disciplining physicians, if at all).  
 53 
doctors.299  While our instinct may be to lock up dangerous doctors, such an approach may actually 
have the opposite effect on patient safety by feeding into the culture of silence—if doctors face 
harsh consequences, colleagues will be less likely to make referrals, and impaired physicians 
themselves will try harder to hide their substance abuse.300   
A second critique of the PPSA focuses on its lack of specificity.  The Act did not enumerate 
the process by which doctors would be chosen for random testing, “leaving the door open for less-
than-random selection” which is “of particular concern given the increasingly competitive business 
environment” of the medical field.301  Similarly, the PPSA stated that doctors would be drug tested 
at hospitals, but did not specify whether the hospital’s medical staff or its administration would be 
the entity in charge of testing.302  Accordingly, should a state enact a statute to test HCWs, it should 
specify these details.  For example, when Massachusetts General Hospital began drug testing all 
members of its anesthesiology department in 2008,303 it tested residents twice a year during their 
first year of employment, and at least once a year for their second and third years at the hospital.304  
The Massachusetts hospital later reported the program’s success in deterring drug use among its 
one hundred employees.305  Conversely, the original HB-597 proposed to drug test all HCWs four 
times a year. 306   Perhaps, at least initially, a state might aim to emulate the successful 
                                                        
299 Pham & Provonost, supra note 213, at 913.  One reason the PPSA seems more punitive than rehabilitative is 
because California is one of the few states without a Physician Health Program (PHP).  See Id. at 914.  See also Bathen, 
supra note 38 (explaining that California’s PHP was shut down in 2008 when audits revealed “major flaws” that 
helped members provide false urine samples, allowing them to finish the program and return to practice). 
300 Pham & Provonost, supra note 213, at 913.   
301 Ejnes, supra note 18, at 912.  
302 Id.  
303 See discussion infra Part VII.  
304 Abramson, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
305 Id. at 14. 
306 H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013). 
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Massachusetts program, especially if employers are concerned about the cost of administering 
such tests.307 
A final criticism of Proposition 46, and perhaps of drug testing physicians more generally, is 
the damage caused by false positives and faulty referrals, especially in a state with a slow-moving 
medical board.308  Natasha Minsker of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California 
stated that the testing “could easily yield positive tests from legitimately prescribed drugs” and 
“creates a presumption of negligence.”309  Upon a positive test result, the state attorney general 
would temporarily suspend the doctor’s license pending an investigation, during which time the 
physician could not practice, and his patients would not be treated.310  Moreover, “the Act does 
not specify a time frame for an investigation and hearing to determine whether the physician was 
impaired,” potentially holding doctors in limbo for an unreasonable amount of time.311  Finally, 
Richard Thorp, president of the California Medical Association, spoke out against the 
consequences of failing to submit to a test: according to the PPSA, if a doctor does not submit to 
a test within the required period, he could have his license suspended, which Thorp argues is 
“overreaching and so draconian.”312   
While these critiques are fair, one aspect of the PPSA that is difficult to argue with is the swift 
removal of a doctor from duty upon a confirmed positive drug test.  Through its reference to the 
                                                        
307 See e.g., One State May Require Drug Tests For Hospital Workers, THE ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/02/28/one-state-may-require-drug-tests-for-hospital-workers.  
(explaining that Cary Cahoon, the vice president of New Hampshire’s Association of Residential Care Homes, 
opposed the original HB-597 because randomly testing his 13 workers would cost him $5,700 a year).    
308 Elbein, supra note 81 (explaining that although six doctors and lawyers complained to the Texas Medical Board 
about Dr. Duntsch, it took the Board over a year to finally revoke his license—by that time, Duntsch had already killed 
two patients and paralyzed four through his “surgical misadventures.”). 
309 Id.  
310 Ejnes, supra note 18, at 911–912. 
311 Id.  
312 Levin, supra note 282.  But see Johnson, supra note 46 (explaining that for Dr. Gaither, who struggled with a 
drinking problem as a resident, the temporary loss of his license was necessary to finally set him on the path to sobriety 
after a failed intervention in medical school, and an unsuccessful meeting with the head of his residency program, 
wherein Gaither signing a contract to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and agree to be tested).  
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DOT regulations, the PPSA called for the confirmatory testing of a provided sample and review 
by a Medical Review Officer of the sample and the employee’s medical and prescription 
information to increase the chance that the result is not a false positive.313  Adding such safeguards 
would help protect doctors from the damage to their reputation of a false positive while keeping 
the public safe. 
E.     Relying on a Drug Test Alone is Not Enough to Ensure Patient Safety 
Drug testing HCWs by itself will not keep patients safe.  All a drug test can do is identify an 
impaired HCW and remove him from his duties for a period of time.  But what happens when that 
period expires, and the still-addicted HCW is able to return to work?  While such a situation can 
be dangerous with any HCW, if the employee is one with access to drugs at work, he could be 
returning to the most dangerous place for him to be, where he can harm both himself and his 
patients.314  Furthermore, if substance abuse is a result of the HCW’s self-medication because of 
his stressful occupation, we owe it to that doctor to provide him treatment to save his own life.   
For this reason, opponents emphasize the need for rehabilitation programs, like Physician 
Health Programs (PHPs), through which HCWs can receive treatment for their addiction, attend 
group therapy, and be monitored when they return to work.315  Most states have PHPs, and studies 
reporting the effectiveness boast success rates as high as 80 or 90%.316  PHPs offer a variety of 
services, such as “disease management, support, long-term monitoring of illness and treatment 
                                                        
313 This sort of procedure is included in 49 C.F.R. § 40.123.  
314  Lauren Cox, Urine Drug Tests for Doctors?, ABC NEWS MEDICAL UNIT (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/PainManagement/print?id=6232694 (describing a study by the Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation in Ohio, which revealed that 80% of anesthesiologist residency training programs have experienced 
problems with impaired doctors, and another 19% of programs experienced the death of an anesthesiologist due to 
overdose).  See also Seppala, supra note 77 (explaining the high death rate among anesthesiologists, and the studies 
reporting that when these physicians return to work following treatment, they often may be prevented from working 
in the operating room, where they would have “have to handle on a daily basis the very drugs to which they were 
addicted.”).  
315 Seppala, supra note 77.  
316 Bathen, supra note 38.  
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efforts, advocacy, help with fulfilling reporting requirements,” etc.317  Further, a 2008 study of 800 
physicians who had recently completed such programs found that after five years, 65% of the 
subjects remained drug- and/or alcohol-free.318   For PHPs to be successful, however, they need to 
be confidential to encourage professionals to both turn themselves in and/or refer their colleagues.  
Without this promise of privacy, the stigma of substance abuse will keep away HCWs who truly 
need treatment.319 
Likewise, these types of program need to begin earlier.  Medical schools need to educate their 
students on the dangers of substance use and abuse, since “for many physicians, substance abuse 
begins early during medical school and residency.320  Moreover, medical schools should test 
students to prevent recreational drug use from turning into a crippling addiction.  While some 
schools already feature testing,321 more schools should adopt such procedures.322  Further, HCWs 
must learn, through school or otherwise, how to identify an impaired individual, and the 
                                                        
317 Seppala, supra note 77.  
318 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, supra note 85.  Of course, this means that one in three doctors relapse, suggesting that these 
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322 Medical schools should test their students because drug use and addiction can begin in the school and clinical 
settings.  See, eg., Johnson, supra note 46 (explaining that Dr. Gaither struggled with his addiction throughout 
medical school and his residency program); see also Elbein, supra note 90 (noting that Dr. Duntsch was allegedly 
treated for drug abuse while a resident at the University of Tennessee).  
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importance of identifying such people.323  Although HCWs are under an obligation to report 
impaired colleagues, they often fail to do so.324   
Finally, the medical field needs a more protective whistleblower law.  Despite their moral, 
legal, and ethical obligation to report colleagues they know to be impaired, HCWs fail to carry out 
that duty because of the culture of silence and the threat to their careers of turning in a fellow 
medical professional.325  If a state enacting a law to drug test HCWs likewise adopts a statute to 
protect those who report their colleagues, the testing law may be more effective.326 
VII.     The Downside of Testing Health Care Workers 
While this Comment mainly focuses on the need to test medical professionals for drugs and 
alcohol, there are some unintended consequences of adopting legislation calling for such testing.  
Many believe testing will drive HCWs out of the medical field, or at least limit their practice areas, 
not only because of the fear of getting caught (the intended consequence), but also because testing 
will: 1) make it more dangerous to perform certain procedures; 2) make it too expensive to practice 
medicine generally; 3) be degrading to medical employees; and 4) be ineffective. 
Some opponents claim that drug testing following an adverse event will force HCWs out of 
the riskier areas of medicine.  For example, will testing lead to a decrease in aides in nursing 
homes, or prevent a surgeon from operating on particularly vulnerable patients?  Perhaps, but it 
should be noted that in defining “adverse events,” certain states, like California, limit the events 
                                                        
323 See Seppala, supra note 77 (explaining that HCWs may be hesitant to talk to and/or report a colleague because 
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primary care physicians are unable to recognize” the indicators of abuse and/or addiction in a colleague).  
324 Ejnes, supra note 18, at 912 (“Our efforts to date to address [impairment] have fallen short and are for the most 
part reactive.  Despite our professional obligation to report impaired colleagues, we have been reluctant to do so.”). 
325 Baldisseri, supra note 320, at S111.   
326 Bathen, supra note 38 (explaining Dr. Gregory Skipper’s belief that a “snitch law” is necessary to encourage 
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to the death or injury of “normal, healthy patient[s].” 327  Thus, it is possible that the state adopting 
drug testing for HCWs already has, or will implement, these provisions in its statutes. 
Another view shared by opponents is that drug testing will make practicing medicine generally 
too expensive, forcing HCWs to leave the field due to cost.328  One response to this critique is the 
approach taken by Proposition 46, which would have required doctors themselves to pay for the 
tests, and increased licensing fees to enable the state medical boards to review the results of the 
tests and initiate investigations of allegations of substance abuse.329  While this approach seems to 
put all of the costs on doctors, drug testing itself may decrease the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance and litigation,330 enabling doctors to earn more money, and making these tests and fees 
affordable. 
A third argument is that drug testing HCWs would be unethical and degrading because of the 
cultural status of medical professionals in our country, and the invasion of privacy accompanying 
such tests.  Proponents would respond to this argument by pointing out that drug and/or alcohol 
testing, whether by breath, urine, or blood tests, have been upheld by courts for safety-sensitive 
employees, a class to which HCWs belong.  Accordingly, if the invasion of privacy does not render 
the testing of pilots and teachers unreasonable,331 the same would be true for HCWs.  Likewise, if 
testing is not unethical for other safety-sensitive employees, it could not be morally objectionable 
to test medical professionals.332 
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Finally, opponents argue that drug testing is largely ineffective, so those in the medical field 
should not be subjected to it.  Such an argument is unconvincing because the same rates of 
effectiveness apply to drug testing no matter the subject of the test: if drug testing is so flawed, 
why subject only certain subsets of the safety-sensitive class of employees to testing and exempt 
others, like HCWs?333  Furthermore, some hospitals have instituted random drug testing for their 
employees in recent years and have reported the success of these programs.334  For instance, in 
2005, Massachusetts General Hospital began randomly testing all 100 employees of its Department 
of Anesthesia and Critical Care.335  The residents were subject to at least two random tests in their 
first year of residency, and at least one random test during the second and third years.336  The 
program also randomly tested “staff anesthesiologists and nurse anesthetists…within six months 
of their biannual reappointment.”337  The Massachusetts hospital found that, “since the institution 
of th[e] program, there have been no reported cases of drug abuse” in its anesthesiology residency 
program.338  
VIII.     Conclusion 
 Based on drug testing precedent, HCWs are an appropriate class of employees to 
constitutionally test for drugs and alcohol.  Not only is the government’s interest in testing HCWs 
significant due to the rate of substance abuse within the profession and its safety-sensitive nature, 
but these professionals also have a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of being in a highly 
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regulated field.  Further, the guideposts advanced in this Comment, reflecting aspects of programs 
upheld by courts, provisions mentioned in proposed legislation, and suggested reforms from those 
within and without the medical field, are minimally intrusive and respect HCW privacy by keeping 
results confidential and reducing the discretion administrators have in carrying out the program.  
While the suggested program proposes to test all HCWs, such a broad application is warranted 
based on the danger inherent in any sort of patient treatment, no matter the degree of actual physical 
contact.   
Although adopting such legislation may risk some negative consequences, such as scaring 
medical employees away from certain types of procedures or making it more expensive to practice 
medicine generally, the advantages of testing HCWs far outweigh the disadvantages.  For years, 
different sectors of society have called for the random drug testing of medical employees, and for 
years, such provisions have been put off.  Despite reliance on self-regulation and Physician Health 
Programs, the rate of substance abuse among HCWs is not subsiding, and a change is necessary to 
protect patients.  While the medical field may have to pay the price of relinquishing some control 
and perhaps expending more money to monitor professionals, the result is a healthier and more 
reliable profession, and as such, greater safety for patients.   
Upon graduating medical school, doctors take the Hippocratic Oath, and swear to uphold the 
following statements: “[m]ost especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death . . . . . 
I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my fellow human 
beings . . . .”339  A random drug test a few times a year can be instrumental in saving lives, and it 
is surely a facet of the special obligation those in the health care professions hold to their fellow 
human beings.  
                                                        
339 Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001),  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html 
 61 
 
 
 
